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ARTICLES
OF FABLES AND FEDERALISM: A RE-EXAMINATION




This Article responds to recent scholarship questioning the need
for environmental statutes that place prnmary responsibility for
regulation in the hands of the federal government. These claims are
based, in part, upon assertions that state and local governments had
made great progress on a number of pollution fronts before the m4/or
federal environmental statutes were passed in the 1970s. Earlier
scholarly work demonstrates that these claims lack credible empirical
and historical support with respect to water pollution. This Article will
focus on similar arguments with respect to air pollution, the area where
critics contend the most extensive data exists supporing their
assertions As this Article wil demonstrate, the data upon which these
critics have relied is seriously flawed and cannot be relied upon to
support the contention that sulfur dioxide and particulate matter
pollution were declining in the years before substantial federal
regulatory involvement. In fact, additional empirical data reveals that
sulfur dioxide pollution was growing much worse during these years.
While this additional evidence shows that particulate matter pollution
was unprovmg this Article reveals that most of this improvement can
be attributed to a variety of nonregulatory technical and economic
developments. This conclusion is buttressed by an exploration of state
* Edgar L. Clarkson Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law; B.A., The College
of Wooster; J.D. Columbia University. I would like to thank David Driesen, Heather Elliott,
Robert Glicksman, and Rena Steinzor for reading and commenting on an earlier version of this
paper. I am also grateful to the University of Alabama Law School Foundation for its support of
my work over the years.
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and local regulatory efforts during this time period that confirms the
view that these efforts were fragmentary and, on the whole, ineffective.
The lack of broad progress prior to 1970 is then contrasted with the
remarkable progress that has been achieved through the Clean Air Act
of 1970. The empilical and historical record thus casts serious doubt on
the claim that federal authority could be reduced today without
producing adverse environmental impacts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The decade of the 1970s witnessed a veritable explosion of
environmental law. Frustrated by the nation's seeming inability to control
the fouling of our water, air, and land, Congress cast aside prior, less
ambitious regulatory approaches and passed a series of pollution statutes
that were sweeping in their scope and uncompromising in their rigor.' In
doing so, Congress vastly expanded the federal government's role in
pollution control.' Programs that had relied primarily on state initiative, like
both the clean air and clean water programs, were now largely federally
driven, with the new U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
responsible for setting most pollution standards and the states generally
responsible for implementing those requirements,3 although the states were
1 See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 67-71 (2004) (noting that
"[tihe substantive terms of many of these laws were unprecedented in their reach").
2 Id at 69-70 ("A listing of the federal environmental laws enacted in the 1970s illustrates
the dramatic nature of the virtual revolution in law that occurred.").
3 See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary
Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1155-63 (1995) ("Congress recognized that a high level of state
involvement was a practical necessity for effective implementation. .. .").
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free, in most instances, to establish more stringent standards.' The political
structure of environmental law had thus changed in a fundamental way.
Although the states still had a significant role to play under this
"cooperative" approach to federalism, the EPA was clearly the senior
partner in the relationship. The states had lost their predominant position.
This new approach to environmental protection produced tremendous
progress. The air is markedly cleaner today,' water pollution has declined,'
and the problem posed by hazardous waste has been reduced dramatically.'
Controversy, however, still surrounds Congress's decision to give the federal
government the leading role in environmental regulation. The critics of this
approach, including some prominent legal scholars, would like to return
regulatory primacy to the states, although most would accept the need for a
continuing, albeit more modest, federal presence in the field.
Many critics would concede that some federal involvement is necessary
in cases involving interstate pollution, since states have little incentive to
deal effectively with the spillover effect, for example, of air or water
pollution generated within their own borders and discharged into an
adjoining state." In addition, few would question the fact that the federal
government enjoys economies of scale when it comes to producing and
analyzing scientific and technical data.0 This role could, however, be
detached from primary regulatory authority with the federal government
returning to the informational and support role that it had played prior to the
4 See, e.g, Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 741 (2006); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (2006).
5 See Craig N. Oren, Is the Clean AirAct at a Crossroads., 40 ENVTL. L. 1231, 1235-37 (2010)
("[Tihe Act has been quite successful in reducing air pollution."); see infra Part V.
6 See William L. Andreen, Water Qualty Today-Has the Clean WaterAct Been a Success.,
55 ALA. L. REV. 537, 569-73 (2004) [hereinafter Andreen, Water Quality Todayj ("'[Tlhe evidence
is overwhelming' that the regulatory and policy design of the CWA has 'achieved significant
successes in many waterways'") (quoting U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROGRESS IN WATER
QUALITY: AN AVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL INVESTMENT IN MUNICIPAL WASTEWATER TREATMENT 4-
11 (2000); ANDREW STOODARDETAL, MUNICIPAL WASTEWATER TREATMENT: EVALUATING
IMPROVEMENTS IN NATIONAL WATER QUALITY 195 (2002)).
7 See Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 MD.
L. REV. 1516, 1521-22 (1995) (noting that it is difficult to know how we far we have come unless
we look back at history).
8 See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-
Bottom" Rationale for Federal En vironm ental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1222-23 (1992)
[hereinafter Revesz, Rethinldng the 'Race-to-the-Bottom I (arguing that "states would have the
incentive to underregulate because part of the benefits of regulation would accrue to other
states"); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1215-16 (1977) ("[Sltates
are likely to favor federal intervention to eliminate the more damaging forms of spillover."); see
also Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case
for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. (SYMPOSIUM
ISSUE) 23, 33 (1996) (stressing that the problem could be addressed by "fairly minimal" federal
regulation, or by some other response).
9 See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 86 (5th ed.
2007) ("Seldom, if ever, does one encounter calls for the federal government's surrender of
these informational roles, due to the widely shared view that federal action benefits from
economies of scale.").
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1970s." On the other hand, these economies of scale clearly extend beyond
the mere generation of environmental information and would logically
include the sometimes enormous task of setting standards based upon that
information. It would be difficult to imagine any single state or even a group
of states having either the resources or inclination to develop the kind of
technology-based effluent limitations that EPA promulgated under the Clean
Water Act. The same would likely be true for any number of programs under
the Clean Air Act including ambient air quality standards, new source
performance standards, and standards for hazardous air pollutants.
Those who favor decentralization often contend that state primacy
would better reflect the fact that certain regions in the country place a
higher value on environmental quality than others and that state primacy
would promote experimentation with different governmental policies." The
states, however, seldom utilize their power to set higher standards." In a
decentralized system, of course, they could set less protective standards, but
that ability would run counter to the argument that all Americans are
entitled to enjoy a certain level of environmental protection regardless of
where they choose to live or travel in the nation.'3 A centralized system,
moreover, reduces the number of political arenas in which significant policy
and legal questions are addressed, thus, empowering citizens and
environmental groups to compete on a more level playing field with large
business and industrial interests.14
10 See Butler & Macey, supra note 8, at 48-50 (suggesting that the economies of scale
offered by centralized research and data collection could be realized by the federal government,
even while most policymaking and implementation are conducted by the states).
11 Stewart, supra note 8, at 1210; see also Peter H. Schuck, Some Reflections of the
Federalism Debate, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 11-16 (1996) (arguing that "each
state possesses a distinctive social character and political culture"). It is also said that state
primacy is desirable in order to take into account unique local environmental and geographical
conditions. Butler & Macey, supra note 8, at 53-54. Such conditions, however, are not normally
confined within the borders of one state but are normally found in other states in the same
region. Id. at 53-56. In addition, there are many ways in which the cooperative approach found
in the current pollution control framework permits states, within certain limits, to take such
conditions into account. The water quality standards program in the Clean Water Act is one
such example. See Andreen, Water Quality Today, supra note 6, at 548-49.
12 DANIEL P. SELMI & KENNETH A. MANASTER, 1 STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §§ 10:5,
11:3 (2011).
13 Rena I. Steinzor, Devolution and the Public Health, 24 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 351,
370 (2000).
14 See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MicI. L. REv. 570, 650
(1996) (suggesting that centralization will create more equal footing for conflicting interests);
Stewart, supra note 8, at 1213 (stating that environmental groups have a greater impact and
more leverage when policy decisions are made at a centralized level rather than on a state or
local level because of the strong industrial and union pressures faced by the local and state
governments). Centralization, therefore, would tend to better recognize the diversity of
attitudes and policy preferences that actually exist in the nation. See GLIcKSMAN ET AL., Supra
note 9, at 90-91 (noting that centralization allows for more attention to issues, more press
coverage, and greater awareness of the views of citizens). However it is certainly true that
concentrated industrial interests may be able in many instances to overwhelm the views of
citizens and environmental groups at the national level. See Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the
Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Cridcs, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 542
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The justification for federalized environmental regulation that is most
commonly challenged is the belief that states in a decentralized system will
be tempted to engage in a race to the bottom in order to attract and retain
industry through lax environmental standards, weak implementation, and
lethargic enforcement." The fact that so many states have enacted statutes
either forbidding or restricting the ability of state regulators to exceed
federal standards'6 suggests that the fear of competitive disadvantage, so
basic to the notion of a race to the bottom, remains pervasive in state
capitals." While one might offer occasions on which individual states have
(1997) [hereinafter Revesz, A Response to Critics] (arguing that an unfair playing field "could
occur at the federal level as well as at the state level"); see also Wendy Wagner, Katherine
Barnes, & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA's Toxic Emission
Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 103-04 (2011) (tracing imbalanced interest group engagement
favoring industry in the federal environmental rulemaking life cycle).
15 See Stewart, supra note 8, at 1211-12 (discussing the tendency of states to reject higher
environmental standards and adopt lower standards without nationwide environmental
standards). It is not altogether relevant whether a particular industry will actually leave a
particular state in pursuit of a more relaxed regulatory environment. William L. Andreen, The
Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States-State, Local and Federal Efforts,
1789-1972: Part 122 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 155 (2003) [hereinafter Andreen, Evolution of Water
Pollution Control: State and Local Efforts]. What is relevant are the perceptions and fears of
state politicians who "have relatively little 'bacon'" to dispense other than economic
development. Id.
16 With regard to water pollution, at least 18 states have acted to constrain the ability of
their state pollution agencies from promulgating standards that are tougher than federal
minimum requirements. See Andrew Hecht, Obstacles to the Devolution of Environmental
Protection: States' Self-Imposed Limitations on Rulemaking, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 105,
116 (2004) (identifying 17 states with "no more stringent" rules that prevent state agencies from
imposing environmental regulations that are more stringent than federal regulations); NC Law
Restricts Environmental Rulemaking, 80 U.S.L.W. 143, 143 (2011) [hereinafter NC Restricts
Envtl. Rulemakingl (adding North Carolina to the states that prohibit the enactment of more
stringent environmental regulations, apart from some "serious and unforeseen threat" to public
welfare). And at least 27 state agencies are wholly or partially forbidden, either by state law or
policy, from setting stricter air quality regulations. STATE & TERRITORIAL AIR POLLUTION
PROGRAM ADM'RS & AsS'N OF LOCAL AIR POLLUTION CONTROL OFFICIALS, RESTRICTIONS ON THE
STRINGENCY OF STATE AND LOCAL AIR QUALITY PROGRAMS 1 (2002), available at
http://www.4cleanair.org/stringency-report.pdf; NC Restricts Envt. Rulemaking, supra, at 143
(adding North Carolina to the states that are wholly or partially forbidden from setting stricter
environmental regulations). Of the 23 states that are not precluded from adopting more
stringent air pollution standards, only 14 report that they actually set tougher standards at a rate
greater than "infrequently." RESTRICTIONS ON THE STRINGENCY OF STATE AND LOCAL AIR QUALITY
PROGRAMS, supra, at 2.
17 See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It
"To the Bottom"? 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 348 (1997) (discussing that the trend towards "federal
minimum/state maximum" environmental regulations evidences that the race-to-the-bottom still
exists); Jerome M. Organ, Limitations on State Agency Authority to Adopt Environmental
Standards More Stringent than Federal Standards: Policy Considerations and Interpretive
Problems, 54 MD. L. REV. 1373, 1393 (1995) (noting that the trend for state governments to set
federal minimum standards as state maximum standards indicates that "the concern about the
'race-to-the-bottom' in the absence of federal minimum standards remains valid"). It is possible,
on the other hand, to infer that state officials just believe, either normatively or on the basis of
some cost-benefit or technical analysis, that the federal standards are too stringent. See Engel,
supra (states may be "simply attempting to minimize the welfare losses that would accrue from
more stringent standards").
632 ENVIRONMENTAL LA W [Vol. 42:627
set stricter requirements in an effort to cast some doubt on the existence of
this fear, the infrequency with which states actually do so would appear to
strengthen the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis.'9
Richard Revesz, however, questioned the theoretical basis of the
hypothesis in 1992." Using neoclassical economic models, he argued that
there was no support for the belief that competition among the states for
industry would result in a race that harms overall social welfare since such
competition, although it would tend to create less stringent environmental
standards, would produce an efficient allocation of industrial activity
through industrial migration.' Even were there a basis to believe that a
socially undesirable race would take place in the environmental arena, he
argued that federal minimum standards could not effectively protect overall
social welfare since states could simply lower standards in other areas.1
Revesz ignited a flurry of debate in the legal academy.n Several scholars
challenged his theoretical approach contending that it was based on
unrealistic assumptions,24 while Kirsten Engel demonstrated empirically that
18 See Revesz, Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" supra note 8, at 1227-28 (explaining
how several Northeastern states agreed to "reduce substantially the emission of nitrogen oxides
by electrical utilities" and also announced that they would "adopt California's pollution control
requirements for automobiles, which are more stringent than the federal standards").
19 See SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 12 (noting that it is rare for states to set stricter air or
water pollution standards than required by federal law). For instance, among the states that are
not precluded from adopting more stringent air pollution standards, 14 report that they have
done so only "infrequently." RESTRICTIONS ON THE STRINGENCY OF STATE AND LOCAL AIR QUALITY
PROGRAMS, supra note 16, at 2; NC. Restricts Envti. Rulemaking, supra, note 16 at 143 (noting
the passage of a North Carolina law, adding it to the list of states that are wholly or partially
forbidden from setting stricter environmental regulations). A number of states, however, have
acted from time to time as important laboratories of democracy, filling regulatory gaps and
creating models worthy of emulation by other jurisdictions, including the federal government.
See William L. Andreen, Delegated Federalism Versus Devolution: Some Insights from the
History of Water Pollution, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF
FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION 257, 261-62 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009) [hereinafter Andreen,
Delegated Federalism Versus Devolution] (describing some of the "innovative approaches"
states have taken to environmental problems). California's regulation of automobile emissions
and the efforts by approximately half of the states to do something to mitigate climate change
are notable examples. See William L. Andreen, Federal Climate Change Legisladon and
Preemption, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 261, 274-79, 287 (2008) (providing an overview of
the different ways states have committed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions).
20 Revesz, Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" supra note 8, at 1211.
21 Id. at 1211-12, 1232.
22 Id at 1245-46.
23 Ann E. Carlson, Interactive Federalism and Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1097, 1102
(2009).
24 See Esty, supra note 14, at 629-38 (discussing the differences between race-to-the-bottom
and regulatory competition theories); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to
Undesirability Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law,
14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 67, 94-105 (1996) (criticizing Revesz's analysis of the
race-to-the-bottom); see also Engel, supra note 17, at 280 (contending that empirical data
demonstrates that the assumptions relied upon by the critics are "unlikely to hold true in the
real world").
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state officials commonly believe that industrial development concerns affect
the quality of environmental decisionmaking in their states."0
I do not intend to address these rationales for federal regulation-
interstate spillover effects, economies of scale, the advantages of
centralization as opposed to decentralization, or the race to the bottom-at
any greater length in this Article. Rather, I want to turn my attention to a
rationale that appears to have received less focused attention-the historical
rationale for federal regulation.
Until the 1970s, the primary responsibility for controlling pollution
resided at the state and local level.26 In recognition of the fact that nuisance
law alone could not check unsanitary conditions, health departments were
established beginning in 1866-first at the local level and later at the state
level-to check unsanitary conditions, including those created by water
pollution." By the end of the nineteenth century, a number of cities also
began to adopt smoke abatement ordinances.8 Despite these efforts, air and
water quality continued to deteriorate." Following World War II, the states
began to create new regulatory agencies to control water pollution, a
process that continued in the 1960s with the advent of new air pollution
agencies."o These agencies received both financial and technical support
from the federal government," and by the mid-1960s, Congress began to try
to prod the state agencies to take stronger action by requiring them to
promulgate water quality standards for interstate waters and to set ambient
air quality standards.
According to the conventional wisdom, these state and federal actions
failed to reverse the rising tide of pollution, thus triggering the enactment of
more comprehensive federal legislation in the 1970s, an approach that
shifted the primary responsibility for pollution control from the states to the
newly created EPA.' A number of legal scholars, however, dispute the
25 Engel, supra note 17, at 337-47.
26 Esty, supra note 14, at 600-02.
27 Andreen, Evolution of Water Pollution Control: State and Local Efforts, supra note 15, at
178-80.
28 See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
29 See Andreen, Evolution of Water Pollution Control: State and Local Efforts, supra note
15, at 180-89 (explaining that "[b]acterial and organic water pollution from municipal sources
continued to grow as more and more cities built underground sewers," as did untreated
industrial waste discharges); see infra notes 101-13 and accompanying text.
30 See Percival, supra note 3, at 1155. (describing how states began to respond more to
environmental problems after World War II).
31 See id. at 1155-57 (explaining, for example, that these agencies received federal financial
aid and research assistance as well as "funding for the construction of municipal sewage
treatment plants").
32 Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, § 5(a), 79 Stat. 903 (1965) (amending the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act).
a Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 102(a), 81 Stat. 485 (1967) (amending the
Clean Air Act).
3 See, e.g, Esty, supra note 14, at 600-02 (describing how the "poor performance of states
as environmental regulators" led in part to the federalization of environmental regulation");
Percival, supra note 3, at 1144, 1157, 1160 (noting that environmental law was federalized "after
a long history of state failure to protect what had come to be viewed as nationally important
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accuracy of this account.3 ' They do not question the fact that a perception of
failure was a motivating factor in Congress's action." Rather, these
revisionists challenge the underlying premise that state regulatory action
had not successfully reduced air or water pollution. 7 Their argument is
largely based upon other commentators who claim that the states were
actually making substantial environmental progress in the years before the
1970s.' Three of these commentators examined federal air quality
monitoring data for two air pollutants, total suspended particulates and
sulfur dioxide," and one examined data on organic wastes and bacteria from
EPA's first national water quality inventory that was published in 1974.40
Pointing to the air pollution data, Revesz concludes that state and municipal
regulatory programs were making considerable progress before the federal
regulatory era.4' And pointing to all four commentators (dealing, therefore,
with both air and water pollution), Jonathan Adler asserts that once a
pollution problem was identified and understood, the states and local
governments had begun to act and did so well before the federal
government.42 History thus demonstrates, according to Adler, the
"environmental benefits of decentralization," and provides "ample reason to
question the assumption that lessening federal environmental regulatory
authority necessarily results in lessened environmental protection." 43 Hence,
he argues, our present reliance on a form of cooperative federalism is
interests"); Stewart, supra note 8, at 1196 (stating that the "generally poor record" of the states
in controlling pollution led to the passage of major new federal legislation).
35 See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice
Analysis, 115 HARv. L. REV. 555, 577-78 (2001) thereinafter Revesz, Federalism and
Environmental Regulation]; Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal
Environmental Regulation, 90 IowA L. REV. 377, 464-66 (2005) [hereinafter Adler, Judicial
Federalism].
36 Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation, supra note 35, at 577-78; Adler,
Judicial Federalsm, supra note 35, at 464-66.
37 See Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation, supra note 35, at 578-83 (claiming
that "the concentrations of important air pollutants were falling at significant rates"); Adler,
Judicial Federalism, supra note 35, at 464-66 (citing significant improvement in both water
quality and air pollution).
3S Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation, supra note 35, at 584; Adler, Judicial
Federaism, supra note 35, at 464-66..
39 INDUR GoKLANY, CLEARING THE AIR: THE REAL STORY OF THE WAR ON AIR POLLUTION 49-56
(1999); Paul R. Portney, Air Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 27, 50 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990); ROBERT W. CRANDALL, CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL
POLLUTION: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLEAN AIR 16-21 (1983). A revised version of Paul
Portney's 1990 book chapter later appeared in Paul R. Portney, Air Pollution Policy in PUBLIC
POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 77, 98-99 (Paul R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins eds.,
2d ed. 2000).
40 A. Myrick Freeman III, Water Pollution Poey, in PUBLIc POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 169, 187 (Paul R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2d ed. 2000).
41 Revesz, Federalsm and Environmental Regulation, supra note 35, at 579-83.
42 Adler, Judicial Federalism, supra note 35, at 465-66.
43 Id at 464-65 (emphasis omitted).
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unnecessary, and federal authority can be curtailed without negative
environmental ramifications.'
Is the conventional narrative a "fable" as Adler claims?5 The answer, of
course, depends on the historical record. And care is required in examining
that record because any significant change in our current regulatory
structure could seriously undermine the effectiveness of our national effort
to combat pollution. The question is not whether we should permit state
experimentation. The states can certainly innovate and implement new
policies as long as they do not fall below minimum environmental standards.
The question is whether we are willing to remove that floor, that safety net,
and allow states to pursue policies that fall below those minimum levels.
In a paper published in 2009, I demonstrated that the revisionist
account with respect to water pollution lacked credible historical support.
The 1974 EPA report" on which it was based was badly flawed and could not
be regarded as support for the proposition that water quality was improving
during the ten years preceding the enactment of the Clean Water Act.8 "EPA,
for example, did not attempt to control for variations in stream flow, a factor
that strongly affects concentrations of organic pollutants" as well as other
indicators of water quality.49 This fact casts into doubt EPA's conclusion that
there had been improvements in organic pollution levels between the period
of 1963 to 1967 and that of 1968 to 1972u because large portions of the
country, including the most heavily populated and industrialized regions,
were experiencing drought conditions from 1963 to 1966." A much more
4 See Jonathan H. Adler, The Fable of Federal Regulation, PERC REPORTS, Dec. 2004, at 6,
8, available at http://www.perc.org/pdf/dec04.pdf (encouraging a reevaluation of the current
federal role in environmental protection).
45 See id. at 6 (arguing that "the conventional narrative of the origins of federal regulation is
a fable").
46 See Andreen, Delegated Federalism Versus Devolution, supra note 19, at 257.
47 OFFICE OF WATER PLANNING AND STANDARDS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, I NAT'L WATER
QUALITY INVENTORY: 1974 REPORT TO CONGRESS (1974).
48Andreen, Delegated Federalism Versus Devolution, supra note 19, at 266-67.
49 Id. at 264. For this reason, the Council on Environmental Quality urged that the report "be
interpreted with caution." COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE FIH ANNUAL REPORT 287 (1974). The report also suffered from a
number of other problems. The monitoring stations from which the data were drawn were not
held uniformly constant, a fact that injects "a degree of ambiguity into many of the report's
conclusions" since it was attempting to study water quality trends. Andreen, Delegated
Federalism Versus Devolution, supra note 19, at 264-65. In addition, monitoring and data
collection practices had changed over the study period, a fact that also creates some ambiguity.
See COUNCIL ON ENvrL. QUALITY supra, at 284 (indicating that the report did not take these
changes into account, and thus relied on implicit assumptions that they did not bias the results).
50 Andreen, Delegated Federalism Versus Devolution, supra note 19, at 265-66.
51 Id. at 266-67. The Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, Midwest, and Central states all experienced
widespread drought between 1963 and 1966. See ANDREW STODDARD ET AL., MUNICIPAL
WASTEWATER TREATMENT: EVALUATING IMPROVEMENTS IN NATIONAL WATER QUALITY 111 (2002). It
is not surprising, therefore, that the 1974 report indicated that mean daily stream flows were
much lower from 1963 to 1967 than they were from 1968 to 1972 in the following rivers:
Delaware, Susquehanna, Potomac, Upper Ohio, Missouri, and upper Mississippi. Stream flows
were also lower during the earlier period in the upper and lower Tennessee, lower Arkansas,
2012]1 635
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recent EPA study indicates that the discharge of organic pollutants from
municipal wastewater treatment facilities actually increased 8% between
1962 and 1972,2 data that strongly suggests that EPA's 1974 report was
measuring the impact of dilution upon municipal waste-waste that typically
contains both organic material and bacteria-rather than the impact of
state regulation.
It cannot be denied, however, that water quality was improving in some
locations in the years before 1972.'" Much of the progress was due to the
construction of new sewage treatment facilities,56 a cost that was shared
with the federal government. 7 Nevertheless, the nation was losing ground.
The amount of pollution discharged by our cities and towns was still
growing,M and the amount of water pollution produced by American industry
was simply staggering." Industry at this time was contributing at least 63% of
all wastewater discharged into U.S. waters;o as late as 1968, 70% of
industry's direct discharge received no treatment at all, while much of the
rest received only rudimentary treatment."' In fact, between 1964 and 1968,
the percentage of industrial waste being treated (to one extent or another)
had increased only 1.2%."2 It appears, therefore, that the "fable" in this case is
the revisionist tale. State efforts, even when supported with federal funding
and encouragement, were simply inadequate to the enormous task at hand.
lower Red, lower Colorado, Sacramento, and Willamette Rivers., NAT'L WATER QUALITY
INVENTORY: 1974 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 47, at 35 fig. 11-4.
52. See STODDARD ET AL., supra note 51, at 477 tbl.B-20 (showing a discharge increase from
19,278.2 tons per day in 1962 to 20,831.4 tons per day in 1972).
53 Robert C. Kerr, Pollution or Resources Out-of-Place-Reclaiming Municipal Wastewater
forAgricultural Use, 53 U. COLo. L. REV. 559, 563-64 (1982).
54 Andreen, Delegated Federalism Veisus Devolution, supra note 19, at 266-68.
55 Id. at 268.
56 See id. at 268-69 (discussing the implementation of sewage treatment in areas across the
country).
57 See id. at 269-70. In 1971, EPA estimated that $1 billion per year had been spent on
sewage treatment infrastructure from 1968 to 1971. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 11 THE COST OF
CLEAN WATER: COST EFFECTIVENESS AND CLEAN WATER 64 (1971). By way of contrast, EPA
estimated that industry had spent half that sum, or $500 million per year, on wastewater
infrastructure during the same period. Id
58 See Andreen, Delegated Federalism Versus Devolution, supra note 19, at 270 (comparing
the amount of organic waste discharged in sewage in 1962 with that in 1972).
5 9 Id
60 Id. at 270-71. This figure is likely on the low side because it was based upon a survey that
did not include discharges by manufacturing facilities using less than 20 million gallons of water
per day. Id. at 271 n.80. For that reason, the 80% figure reported in AM. PUB. WORKS AsS'N,
HISTORY OF PUBLIC WORKS IN THE UNITED STATES 1776-1976, at 410 (Ellis L. Armstrong ed., 1976),
may be closer to the mark.
61 Andreen, Delegated Federalsm Versus Devolution, supra note 19, at 271. It is likely that
industry's untreated direct discharge was even higher since it is probable that treatment, even
rudimentary treatment, was more common among the larger industrial facilities included in the
survey than in the smaller ones that were not. See id at 271, n.80 (discussing the percentage of
industrial facilities with treatment sources, and the low presence of treatment at even fairly
large facilities).
62 See id. at 271 (reporting that the overall percentage of treated industrial waste had risen
from 29.2% in 1964 to 30.4% in 1968).
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What about air pollution? Is the revisionist story more accurate in
depicting the amount of progress that states were producing in the years
leading up to the 1970 enactment of the Clean Air Act? The answer, in short,
is no; the revisionist tale is no more valid for air pollution than it was for
water pollution.
Part II of this Article traces the development of air pollution control in
the years between 1881 and 1970. This examination focuses primarily on
state and local efforts, and details how those programs attempted to reduce
emissions, most commonly smoke, through education and persuasion, as
well as by regulation.n Nevertheless, by 1961, less than half of the
communities in the United States that suffered from moderate to severe air
pollution had functioning air pollution control programs,' and only six
states, even with a generous interpretation, could be said to have had
programs that actually enforced air pollution regulations.' The advent of
substantial federal assistance for state and local programs in the early 1960s
stimulated the creation of many more such programs," but, even as late as
1969, most state and local programs remained poorly staffed and basically
ineffective. In fact, half of all of the local air quality control personnel in the
country worked in just five metropolitan areas.' Nevertheless, the
revisionists claim that these programs produced significant progress.9
Part III, therefore, takes a closer look at the two air quality reports upon
which these claims are based. According to the revisionist story, state and
local regulators had succeeded in reducing ambient levels of two air
pollutants, sulfur dioxide and total particulate matter, in the period prior to
1970.0 An analysis of these reports, however, demonstrates that both reports
are significantly flawed and cannot be relied upon to support such a broad
assertion.7 The number of sampling locations from which the data was
gathered was extremely small, and the sampling locations were not
necessarily representative of either urban or rural conditions. 72 The data was
often incomplete, the periods of time analyzed were not extensive, the
sampling methodology was relatively crude, 7 and important meteorological
conditions, such as a widespread drought that occurred for six years in the
early- to mid-1960s, were not taken into account. The reports are simply not
good evidence that either sulfur dioxide or particulate matter pollution were
63 See infra Part H.A. 1-2.
64 See infra Part JI.A.2 and text accompanying note 171.
65 See infra Part H.A.2 and text accompanying notes 176-79 (detailing the limited extent to
which states were devoting resources to air pollution control).
66 See infra Part II.C.
67 See infra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.
68 See infra note 258.
69 See supra Part I.
70 See discussion infra Part lIH.A.
71 See discussion infra Part M.B.
72 See infra notes 333-44 and accompanying text.
73 See infra notes 333-44 and accompanying text.
74 See infra text accompanying notes 340-43.
75 See infra text accompanying note 344.
76 See infra text accompanying notes 345-50, 356.
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improving in the United States in the years before the Clean Air Act was
enacted.
Part IV then explores what can be learned by examining trends in air
pollution emissions, energy consumption, and pollution control in the years
before 1970. It reveals that sulfur dioxide emissions, rather than improving,
were rapidly rising during the years leading up to 1970,n a trend that was
consistent with a dramatic increase in the amount of coal and fuel oil burned
in the United States during the same period"' and the fact that few steps had
been taken before 1970 to control sulfur dioxide emissions.9 On the other
hand, the emissions data indicates that particulate matter emissions were
falling." Most of this progress, however, had little to do with regulatory
efforts. The years following World War II witnessed, for example, the
increasing use of natural gas, rather than coal, to heat homes and
businesses,"' and the railroads replaced their coal-fired locomotives with
new diesel-electric engines. 82 The drop in particulate matter emissions from
the residential/commercial sector and the railroads between 1950 and 1970
appears, in fact, to account for 72% of the overall decline in particulate
emissions during that period, and a drop in forest fires accounts for an
additional 26% of the improvement.8 These numbers, however, do not mean
that some industrial facilities were not taking at least some steps to reduce
their particulate emissions.
In order to save money on fuel, increase capacity, and reduce labor
costs, many companies that used coal turned to new processes and
equipment that burned coal more efficiently and, thus, reduced smoke
emissions." Other industries installed filtration devices that enabled them to
recover valuable products from their emissions.' And still other industries
occasionally took some steps to reduce the magnitude of obvious air
emissions, such as smoke, dust, and fly ash, out of fear that these emissions
would prompt nuisance actions or regulation.86 Nevertheless, it would be
incorrect to overstate the amount of progress that was achieved by industry
before 1970, since the vast majority of the improvement in particulate
pollution between 1950 and 1970 resulted from the adoption of cheap natural
gas as a substitute for coal heating, and from the transition to diesel-
powered locomotives. 7 It would also be incorrect to ascribe more than a
small portion of industry's action to state and local regulation since those
7 See infra notes 361-62 and accompanying text.
78 See infra notes 361-65 and accompanying text.
79 See infra notes 366-68 and accompanying text.
80 See infra notes 369-74, 377-86 and accompanying text.
81 See infra notes 370, 372 and accompanying text.
82 See infra notes 371, 373 and accompanying text.
8 See inkfa note 374 and accompanying text.
84 See infra notes 108, 139, 142-43 and accompanying text.
85 See infra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
86 See infra notes 140, 162-64 and accompanying text.
87 See infra notes 369-76 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 42:627638
OFFABLES AND FEDER4LISM
agencies remained, for the most part, weak and ineffectual throughout this
period."
The lack of broad progress prior to 1970 must be contrasted with the
record produced by the Clean Air Act of 1970. Thus, Part V looks at air
quality and emissions trends since 1970, and demonstrates that the Clean Air
Act has produced dramatic reductions in pollutants such as sulfur dioxide,
carbon monoxide, and the precursors of smog, all of which were increasing
at an alarming rate before 1970.9 It also doubled the rate of decline in
particulate matter pollution over the drop experienced between 1950 and
1970."0 While some problems remain, the Clean Air Act clearly created an
approach that has produced remarkable progress over the past forty-two
years. That record, and the lack of effective regulation during the years
preceding it, provide ample reason to reject the revisionist claim that federal
authority could be reduced today without producing adverse environmental
impacts.
II. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL EFFORTS: 1881 TO 1970
A. State and Local Effoits Prior to 1963
1. The Anti-Smoke Crusade
As the environmental historian Joel Tarr has observed, transitions from
one source of energy to another are nothing new in the United States."' By
the end of the 1700s, the larger cities and towns along the East Coast were
beginning to exhaust easily accessible sources of firewood." While water
power could provide some of the energy demands of the nascent textile
industry, good hydropower sites were limited and water flows varied with
the seasons.' A more consistent and flexible form of power was needed.
Fortunately for the northeastern states, a supply of anthracite coal was
located nearby in the northeastern corner of Pennsylvania, and soon a new
network of canals and railroads was bringing this hard, relatively clean-
burning coal to market in Philadelphia, Baltimore, New York, and Boston.94
West of the Alleghenies, Pittsburgh experienced a different kind of
transformation, this one occasioned by the burning of large amounts of local
bituminous coal. By the start of the Civil War, the use of this soft coal in
Pittsburgh's furnaces and mills had earned the city the derisive moniker of
the "Smoky City."9 Rich deposits of bituminous coal were found throughout
88 See infra Part IV.B.
89 See infra notes 454-458 and accompanying text.
90 See infra notes 370, 454 and accompanying text.
91 JOEL A. TARR, THE SEARCH FOR THE ULTIMATE SINK: URBAN POLLUTION IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 227 (1996).
92 ScoTT HAMILTON DEWEY, DON'T BREATHE THE AIR: AIR POLLUTION AND U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PouTIcs, 1945-1970, at 21 (2000).
93 Id. at 22.
94 See BARBARA FREESE, COAL: A HUMAN HISTORY 112-13, 119-22 (2003).
95 DEWEY, supra note 92, at 22.
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large portions of the Midwest and South, and urban growth and
industrialization in cities such as Cincinnati, St. Louis, Cleveland, Chicago,
and Birmingham were also fueled by the widespread use of smoky
bituminous coal.96 The nation's appetite for coal was rapacious in the years
following the Civil War. Consumption rose from 20 million tons in 1860 to
over 650 million tons in 1918-a peak to which it would not return until the
mid-1940s."' Most of this coal was the smokiest kind, with the use of
anthracite coal dwindling to 17% of the total by 1918."8 Even northeastern
cities, owing to the limited supply and cost of anthracite, had begun to use
cheaper bituminous coal by the turn of the twentieth century."
Beginning with Chicago in 1881, a number of cities enacted ordinances
that attempted to abate the smoke problem.'00 This movement was propelled
by Progressive-era reformers who were concerned about aesthetics and
health concerns, and by local business and civic leaders who were
concerned about the negative impact that smoky conditions would have on
continued economic growth.'o' The ordinances, however, were generally
simplistic'o and most of the smoke control bureaus were poorly resourced. 03
While they occasionally made progress, it was often only temporary,' since
industry was generally successful at thwarting the creation of truly effective
regulatory and enforcement programs.'o Most control authorities, therefore,
96 See id. at 22-23; DAVID STRADLING, SMOKESTACKS AND PROGRESSIVES: ENVIRONMENTALISTS,
ENGINEERS, AND AIR QUALITY IN AMERICA, 1881-1951, at 12 (1999).
97 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES 1789-1945, at 155 (1949); STRADLING, supra note 96, at 12-13. Coal supplied over
75% of the country's energy needs in the 1910s. Id. at 12.
98 STRADLING, supra note 96, at 12
99 Id. at 12, 20. Many New Yorkers feared the impact that growing reliance on bituminous
coal would have on their city. Id. at 17. As Andrew Carnegie told reporters outside his Fifth
Avenue residence in 1902, "If New York allows bituminous coal to get a foothold, the city will
lose one of her most important claims to pre-eminence among the world's great cities, her pure
atmosphere." Id.
100 DEWEY, supra note 92, at 23; NOGA MORAG-LEVINE, CHASING THE WIND: REGULATING AIR
POLLUTION IN THE COMMON LAW STATE 109 (2003).
101 DEWEY, supra note 92, at 24-25; STRADLING, supra note 96, at 16-17; FREESE, supra note
94, at 150-154; MORAG-LEVINE, supra note 100, at 109-11; FRANK UEKOETTER, THE AGE OF SMOKE:
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES, 1880-1970, at 20-21 (2009).
102 The 1881 Chicago ordinance, for example, declared the emission of "dense smoke" to be a
public nuisance, unless it was emitted from a private residence. MORAG-LEVINE, supra note 100,
at 112. Over time, of course, municipal ordinances grew somewhat more complex, but they
remained nuisance-based for the most part during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. See id.
at 115, 118.
103 UEKOETTER, supra note 101, at 26, 40. Some, moreover, were short-lived. The ordinance in
Birmingham, Alabama, was passed in 1912 and weakened at the behest of major manufacturers
in 1913. STRADLING, supra note 96, at 131-32. In 1915, the state legislature administered the coup
de grace by prohibiting communities in Alabama from even enacting such legislation. Id. at 131-
36. See also MORAG-LEVINE, supra note 100, at 113-14 (discussing a number of court cases that
struck down municipal smoke ordinances that were enacted without state authorization).
104 MORAG-LEvINE, supra note 100, at 115; UEKOETTER, supra note 101, at 27.
105 See RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES: A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 207 (2d ed. 2006); DEWEY, supra note 92, at 26
(describing how "unenlightened and unashamed manufacturers could pull strings and
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relied primarily on education and voluntary action to reduce smoke and soot
emissions, often invoking the creed of "smoke means waste."" Smoke is
indeed emblematic of waste, since both smoke and soot are composed of
carbon particles and other combustible material resulting from incomplete
combustion.' In order to save money on fuel, increase capacity, reduce
labor costs, and, in some cases at least, to reduce smoke enussions, many
industrial operations began using mechanical stokers for their coal-fired
boilers and furnaces.'8 Although the new process did not produce the dense
smoke that resulted from hand firing, 9 it created a major new air pollution
problem in the form of cinders and fly ash."o Whatever interest companies
had in lowering their fuel bills, however, ended with the entrance of the
United States into World War I, as did the salience of smoke abatement
efforts."' "War," after all, "meant smoke,"112 and when coupled with large
increases in industrial production, air quality in American cities fell
precipitously."3
The war, however, created only a temporary hiatus in the smoke
abatement movement. Although coal consumption declined to pre-war levels
in the 1920s,"' efforts to control smoke resumed."' By 1930, a total of fifty-
one cities had smoke control ordinances coupled with smoke abatement
manipulate those city councilors they controlled to prevent or delay [smoke control]
regulation"). By so often focusing upon nuisance as the governing standard, municipal pollution
authorities often found themselves in a dilemma. They could either demand abatement,
regardless of how feasible that might have been in a given instance, or ignore the violation,
because they had no discretion to fashion a solution between the two extremes. See MORAG-
LEVINE, supra note 100, at 118.
106 UEKOETTER, supra note 101, at 94. By seeking voluntary cooperation, the municipal
authorities were often doing the only thing that seemed available to them, especially since
enforcement was a resource-intensive endeavor for the "[c]hronically understaffed pollution
agencies." MORAG-LEVINE, supra note 100, at 118.
107 NAT'L AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, CONTROL
TECHNIQUES FOR PARTICULATE AIR POLLUTANTS 2 (1969) [hereinafter NAPCA, CONTROL
TECHNIQUES FOR PARTICULATES].
108 Arthur C. Stem, History of Air Pollution Legislation in the United States, 32 J. AIR
POLLUTION CONTROL Ass'N 44, 46 (1982). The steel industry was also prompted by economics to
begin the transition from filthy and wasteful beehive coking ovens to new by-products ovens,
which were more efficient, produced high quality coke, and also yielded valuable amounts of
ammonium sulphate (fertilizer), tar, and gas to heat the coking chambers. Edwin C. Eckel, The
American Steel Industry under Competition, 46 ENG'G MAG. 663, 683-84 (1914).
109 Clouds of black smoke were created when bituminous coal was shoveled by hand "onto
an up-draft stationary flat grate." Stern, supra note 108.
110 Id at 46-47. "Mechanical stokers [could also] handle much poorer grades of coal than...
hand firing." F. Parkman Coffin, The Use of Low-Grade Mineral Fujels and the Status of
Powdered Coal, 20 GEN. ELECTRIC REV. 606, 614 (1917).
111 STRADLING, supra note 96, at 147.
112 Id. at 138 (quoting remarks by Franklin Lane, Secretary of the Interior, in 1917).
113 See id. at 147-52 (describing the war-time increase in production as well as a decrease in
enthusiasm for curbing smoke and the subsequent drop in air quality).
114 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 97, at 155.
115 STRADLING, supra note 96, at 153.
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bureaus. 6 Most of these bureaus continued to encourage voluntary smoke
abatement by emphasizing the cost savings that could accompany more
efficient combustion practices."' Coal, however, was both abundant and
inexpensive after the war, reducing industry's incentive to invest in new,
more efficient equipment."8 As a result, relatively little progress was made.""
Even though coal usage declined precipitously during the Depression,'28
St. Louis embarked on a new, tougher course on smoke in 1937. Through
ordinances approved in 1937 and 1940, the city council, at the behest of a
former mechanical engineering professor, Raymond Tucker, required both
industrial and domestic sources of smoke to use either higher-grade coal or
better combustion techniques such as automatic stokers. 12 Tucker,
furthermore, enforced these ordinances with a highly trained, professional
staff, and soon the coal smoke over St. Louis began to clear. '2 The success in
St. Louis, however, owed much to the fact that its residents and industries
could meet the new requirements by merely switching from the use of low-
grade Illinois coal to a higher-grade coal produced in nearby Arkansas.'23
The example of St. Louis gave heart to anti-smoke crusaders in
Pittsburgh who, despite decades of effort, had made little progress.124 Urged
on by the press, angry housewives, and many civic leaders, the city council
passed a St. Louis-style smoke ordinance in July 1941.2" Although
implementation was delayed by the onset of the Second World War, the
dreary conditions produced by wartime iron and steel production-
requiring, for example, that the streetlights in downtown Pittsburgh
remained lit even at midday-made clear that enforcement would have to be
116 Stern, supra note 108, at 44 tbl.1. Approximately 140 other cities had smoke control
ordinances, but no organization, personnel, or budget for implementation. See id. The situation
in the North tended, on the whole, to be better than it was in the South where cities like
Chattanooga, Memphis, Louisville, Nashville, and Birmingham were doing next to nothing. See
DEWEY, supra note 92, at 28. On the other hand, if the South lagged behind, "it was not by much,
for the 1920s and 1930s generally saw relatively little smoke control action at either the state or
local level in other American regions." Id.
117 MORAG-LEVINE, supra note 100, at 121.
118 Id
119 Id.; STRADUNG, supra note 96, at 155-56. Stradling, in fact, concluded that "the post-
[World War I] antismoke efforts proved no more successful than those before the war, and
perhaps even less so." Id at 156.
120 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 97, at 155 (showing a sharp decline in the annual
consumption of coal during the 1930s).
121 See DEWEY, supra note 92, at 31-32; UEKOETTER, supra note 101, at 77-80 (providing a
brief history of Tucker's successful antismoke efforts in St. Louis).
122 DEWEY, supra note 92, at 31-32.
123 UEKOETTER, supra note 101, at 81.
124 Cliff I. Davidson, Air Polludon in Pittsburgh: A Historical Perspecdve, 29 J. AIR POLLUTION
CONTROL ASS'N 1035, 1039 (1979); see also STRADLING, supra note 96, at 167 (stating that "the
city accomplished little regarding smoke control during the Depression); TARR, supra note 91, at
234 (declaring that "Pittsburgh had been faltering in its fight against smoke in the middle and
late 1930s").
125 TARR, supra note 91, at 234-35, 242-43. The ordinance prohibited "such quantities of soot,
cinders, noxious acids, fumes or gases . . . as to cause injury, detriment, or nuisance to any
person or to the public." UEKOETTER, supra note 101, at 159.
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rigorous once post-war implementation began.'" Those who framed the
ordinance, however, were surprised once implementation began, not only by
the relative speed of success, but also by the way in which it was
accomplished.2 The key to success did not involve the use of cleaner coal or
new combustion processes or gas cleaning equipment; rather, most of the
rapid improvement resulted from another kind of major fuel switch, this
time from coal to natural gas.'2 Due to supply disruptions, higher prices, and
inconvenience, coal began to lose market share to natural gas once pipelines
began to ship low-priced natural gas into the Pittsburgh area.'" Between
1940 and 1950, the number of Pittsburgh households burning natural gas
rose from 17.4% to 66%, and those using coal dropped from 81% to 31.6%.0 In
addition, the railroads were quickly phasing out steam locomotives with
new, cleaner, diesel-electric engines.'3' Within a few years, heavy smoke
events became rare in Pittsburgh.'32 As with St. Louis, the success of the
smoke abatement program was largely due to fuel switching.13' In Pittsburgh,
however, the transition to natural gas would likely have occurred without
regulation; the abatement program perhaps just sped it along.
While many commentators on the cleanup in Pittsburgh have focused
primarily on the shift to natural gas by domestic sources,' industry also
played a role.'3 A number of heavy industries in Pittsburgh, and eventually in
Allegheny County, invested in improved combustion technologies, such as
mechanical stokers, and installed various kinds of smoke abatement
devices.' Many of these steps were undoubtedly required or encouraged by
the smoke control authorities in Pittsburgh, and the same kind of interaction
with agency officials was certainly taking place in a number of other
communities.'8 Elsewhere, however, American industry was also taking
voluntary actions, which served to reduce smoke emissions during the 1950s
126 TARR, supra note 91, at 243-44.
127 Id. at 248-51.
128 STRADLING, supra note 96, at 170-72.
129 See TARR, supra note 91, at 252 (stating that "[pirice and convenience, therefore, drove a
fuel and equipment transition"); see also FREESE, supra note 94, at 143-46 (discussing the
laborious process of burning coal for domestic purposes).
130 TARR, supra note 91, at 252.
131 Id. at 277. The switch was primarily due to economic factors, not environmental ones. Id
at 280. The towboats that plied the city's rivers were also replacing old, coal-fired steam engines
with diesel ones. Davidson, supra note 124, at 1039.
132 See Davidson, supra note 124 at 1040 ("By 1948, downtown visibility improved 67%, and
the city received 89% more sunshine by 1954."); TARR, supra note 91, at 250.
133 "Eventually all smoke-plagued cities would benefit from a shift toward natural gas
heating and diesel locomotion, but none so dramatically as Pittsburgh." STRADLING, supra note
96, at 172.
134 TARR, supra note 91, at 257.
135 See, e.g., id. at 227-28; STRADLING, supra note 96, at 169-71.
136 TARR, supra note 91, at 250 n.44.
137 See Davidson, supra note 124, at 1039 (explaining how industries "replaced old, worn out
equipment with modern facilities designed for smokeless operation"). A smoke control
ordinance applicable to the portions of Allegheny County outside of the City of Pittsburgh was
passed in 1949. Id.
138 Id.
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and 1960s.13 9 While those actions may have been motivated, in part, by a
desire to avoid nuisance actions or "restrictive legislation,"'" or to burnish
their image in the community," one cannot lose sight of the economics
behind the use of more efficient combustion techniques such as mechanical
stokers and the injection of pulverized coal into high-efficiency boilers. Both
of these processes decreased smoke emissions.'42 At the same time, both
processes reduced the amount of coal necessary to produce the same
amount of heat, increased boiler capacity, permitted the use of poorer
grades of coal, and reduced labor costs."3
Despite these efforts, the skies over American cities did not completely
clear. Although the days of heavy smoke were largely a thing of the past in
Pittsburgh, smoke was still a commonplace annoyance in the city, as was fly
ash." Other less visible forms of air pollution were serious problems, as the
tragic air inversion over suburban Donora, Pennsylvania, demonstrated in
1948.145 In fact, despite the hoopla about the success of Pittsburgh's smoke
control program, the U.S. Public Health Service declared in 1966 that
Pittsburgh remained the sixth most heavily polluted city in the country for
air pollution.14 6 Smoke, it appears, had not been the most significant
problem.1
2. The Emergence of Broader Efforts to Deal with Air Pollution
Even as the smoke began to clear, it was obvious that the country
suffered from many other dangerous air pollutants. Toxic industrial
emissions-as well as sulfur dioxide, smog (ozone), carbon monoxide, and
139 See UEKOETTER, supra note 101, at 120-24.
140 Id at 121.
141 See id. at 120-23; see also Robert N. Rickles, Air Pollution Control in the Chemical
Industry, in AIR POLLUTION CONTROL: GUIDEBOOK FOR MANAGEMENT 151, 151 (A. T. Rossano, Jr.
ed., 1969) (referring to public relations and the creation of nuisance problems for residential
neighbors as important reasons for developing an industrial air pollution control program).
142 Stern, supra note 108, at 46; Coffin, supra note 110, at 614, 624.
143 See Stern, supra note 108, at 46 (arguing the development of mechanical stokers and
pulverized coal firing technologies was motivated by a desire to increase efficiency and
decrease labor costs); Coffin, supra note 110, at 614, 618, 630 (discussing how mechanical
stokers and pulverizing technologies coal allowed for industry to use both low-grade and high-
grade coal).
144 Angela Gugliotta, The "Smoky City" Between the Wars, in SMOKE AND MIRRORS: THE
POLITICS AND CULTURE OF AIR POLLuTION 100, 111 (E. Melanie DuPuis ed., 2004).
145 MORAG-LEVINE, supra note 100, at 123. Donora is a small mill town located about 20 miles
from Pittsburgh and was home to a steel plant, a zinc smelter, and a sulfuric acid plant. As a
result of the air inversion, which trapped the pollution from these facilities under a layer of cold
air, 20 people died, dozens were hospitalized, and almost 6,000 became ill. Davidson, supra note
124, at 1039. Five years later, in 1953, a serious smog concentration in New York City killed 200.
Randall B. Ripley, Congress and Clean Air: The Issue of Enforcement, 1963, in CONGRESS AND
URBAN PROBLEMS 224, 225 (Frederic N. Cleaveland ed., 1969).
146 J. CLARENCE DAVIES III & BARBARA S. DAVIES, THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION 158 (2d ed. 1975).
147 MORAG-LEVINE, supra note 100, at 122-23.
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particulate matter other than smokel48-all plagued many urban, suburban,
and rural locations in the United States."'9 Despite increasing public concern
about the adverse health impacts of these air pollutants during the 1950s and
into the 1960s,"'5 many industries and public officials simply downplayed any
problem.'1' In the 1950s, for example, the chemical industry attempted to
minimize the disaster at Donora by urging the public to keep the event in
perspective, saying that "in spite of highly concentrated air-polluting
operations in many localities there has never been a similar occurrence
elsewhere in this country."15 2 And, in the early 1960s, Governor George
Wallace took a deep breath outside a rural Alabama paper mill and
exclaimed: "Yeah, that's the smell of prosperity. Sho' does smell sweet, don't
it?"aL In other instances, industry would argue that more research was
needed before doing anything, or that industry should be left to take
voluntary action because it knew best how to deal with its own problems.M
Manufacturing companies would also sometimes threaten to relocate their
facilities should a community have the temerity to engage in regulation.5
On the occasions when industry did act to control these kinds of
emissions, 15 it appears that it was often prompted to do so, at least in part,
by economic self-interest. The carbon black industry, for example, used
148 Particulate matter pollution includes smoke as well as other small solid or liquid particles
including fly ash and dusts of various kinds. See NAPCA, CONTROL TECHNIQUES FOR
PARTICULATES, supra note 107, at 2 (defining particulate matter as "any material, except
uncombined water, that exists as a solid or liquid in the atmosphere or in a gas stream at
standard conditions").
149 DEWEY, supra note 92, at 228.
150 See id. at 90-93 (describing physicians', scientists', and the public's increasing concerns
with the adverse effects of air pollution); UEKOETTER, supra note 101, at 155, 199 (discussing the
public reaction to air pollution in Pittsburgh and Los Angeles in the 1950s); see also Helen B.
Shaffer, Poisoned Air, EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS, at 238, 239, 244-45 (Apr. 6, 1955)
(referring to the rise of air pollutions problems other than smoke such as smog, sulfur oxides,
nitrogen oxides, hydrocarbons, and various organic substances).
151 See G. Edward Pendray, Management Aspects of Air Pollution: Good Public Relations
Can Be a Powerful Adjunct in Industry's Struggle for Clean Air 77 MECH. ENG'G 581, 582 (1955)
(discussing the process of denial which the author termed the industrial "air-pollution
syndrome").
152 DEWEY, supra note 92, at 245 (quoting from a booklet published by the Manufacturing
Chemists' Association in 1952); see also UEKOETTER, supra note 101, at 210 (referring to a
representative of the automobile industry who asserted at a hearing before the California State
Assembly in 1955 that new cars produced virtually no emissions).
153 DAVID R. GOLDFIELD, PROMISED LAND: THE SOUTH SINCE 1945, at 197 (1987).
154 DEWEY, supra note 92, at 244.
155 See UEKOETTER, supra note 101, at 153-54 (relating a conversation in which the Mayor of
Struthers, Ohio told the U.S. Public Health Service that a representative of the local steel
company had threatened to move portions of its operations if the town regulated the mill's air
emissions); see also EARL FINBAR MURPHY, WATER PURITY: A STUDY IN LEGAL CONTROL OF
NATURAL RESOURCES 105 (1961) (recounting similar threats by the paper industry made in
response to water pollution enforcement efforts in Wisconsin).
156 In 1967, for example, U.S. industrial firms purchased nearly $105 million worth of air
pollution control equipment from U.S. manufacturers. See NAPCA, CONTROL TECHNIQUES FOR
PARTICULATES, supra note 107, at 38 tbl.4-1 (noting that in 1967, manufacturers shipped $110.5
million in industrial gas cleaning equipment and exported $5.7 million in equipment, for a total
of $104.8 million in domestic sales).
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electrostatic precipitators to recover carbon black,"' and paper mills used
them for the "economic recovery of salt cake."'58 The steel industry also
installed a large number of electrostatic precipitators on blast furnaces for
economic purposes," as did the chemical industry in cases where a valuable
aerosol could be collected or where a gas needed to be cleaned for
subsequent use." Although copper, lead, and zinc smelters initially used'
precipitators in their struggle against nuisance actions, an even greater
utility was discovered because precipitators could recover valuable copper,
lead, zinc oxides, and other substances that would otherwise be carried out
of their stacks in the form of dust.'6' In addition to economic purposes, these
devices were often installed in order to forestall nuisance actions, as well as
to delay regulation or improve a company's public image.' These concerns
undoubtedly motivated both the cement industry and coal-fired electric
generating stations to install electrostatic precipitators or other mechanical
systems to reduce their otherwise huge emissions of cement kiln dust" and
fly ash, respectively.' At other times, however, industrial air polluters may
have been reacting, at least in part, to regulatory pressure, although it is not
likely that such pressure was a common factor in these investment
decisions.
Most existing smoke control bureaus were simply not prepared or
equipped to deal effectively with these new challenges. Although some had
been renamed to reflect the wider field of air pollution control, many
continued to focus on smoke control.6 This perhaps reflected the
professional orientation and special expertise of the mechanical engineers
who so often staffed the local agencies. They simply did not have the kind of
157 HARRY J. WHITE, INDUSTRIAL ELECTROSTATIC PRECIPITATION 20 (1963) (noting that
electostatic precipitators were often used in conjunction with a mechanical collector). The use
of an additional device (either a bag filter or scrubber) was necessary, however, if more
appreciable air pollution control was to be achieved. Id.
158 Id. at 21 (describing how electrostatic precipitators allowed paper mills to collect 100 to
150 pounds of salt cake per ton of pulp); NAPCA, CONTROL TECHNIQUES FOR PARTICULATES,
supra note 107, at 18. Higher efficiency precipitators than those generally used were necessary
if more effective air pollution control was actually sought. WHITE, supra note 157, at 21.
159 WHITE, supra note 157, at 16.
160 Id at 18.
161 Id at 10-11.
162 UEKOETTER, supra note 101, at 123. Industry had little interest in dealing with pollutants
such as sulfur dioxide, which had little economic value, were not readily perceptible, and were
likely expensive to control. Id. at 235. For a contemporary discussion of the community
relations opportunity presented by reducing the amount of perceptible air pollutants emitted,
see Pendray, supra note 151, at 584.
163 See, e.g, Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970) ("It
seems reasonable to think that the risk of being required to pay permanent damages to injured
property owners by cement plant owners would itself be a reasonable effective spur to research
for improved techniques to minimize nuisance."); NAPCA, CONTROL TECHNIQUES FOR
PARTICULATES, supra note 107, at 18 (explaining that electrostatic precipitators and fabric filters
were used to try to control emissions of cement kiln dust).
16 See infra notes 429-50 and accompanying text (discussing the fly ash problems created
by the injection of pulverized coal into high-temperature steam boilers).
165 UEKOEITER, supra note 101, at 13, 155-56.
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specialized scientific knowledge that was needed to deal with more
sophisticated problems." The lack of relevant expertise made the search for
appropriate standards nearly impossible.'67 All too often these agencies
simply applied the Ringelmann Scale-a smoke-control era chart that
gauged visible emissions coming out of a smokestack by comparing them to
four shades of grayI-or used "common sense" to regulate other pollutant
problems.'" The agencies also lacked the funds that were necessary to
address a broader, more complicated regulatory agenda.o
In 1961, only 43% of the communities with major or moderate air
pollution problems had control programs whose budget exceeded $5,000 per
year."' Although the eighty-five local programs that served these
communities spent a total of nearly $8 million in 1961, over half of that was
spent in California alone, and 80% of that was spent in Los Angeles."' Even if
the local agencies had been well staffed and funded, their jurisdiction
generally ended at the city line. They simply could not reach the growing
number of polluting facilities that were located in adjacent towns and
unincorporated areas.'7 1 Of the eighty-five local programs with budgets of
over $5,000 per year in 1961, only fifteen were county-wide programs and
seven of thosewere in California. All the rest were municipal programs. 4
The problems posed by limited jurisdiction, underfunding, lack of
scientific expertise, and the sheer absence of programs in many smaller
166 Id. at 156, 159.
167 Id at 160.
168 BUREAU OF MINES, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, RINGELMANN SMOKE CHART 1-2 (1967), available
athttp://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/pubs/pdfs/ic8333.pdf.
169 UEKOETTER, supra note 101, at 160. If a "standard" was applied, it often required the use
of a commonly accepted engineering practice. Id. In short, "[n]o agency was capable of
providing authoritative clarifications, and no regular way of defining norms emerged-one that
would have provided at least procedural backing for threshold values." Id at 162.
170 This comported with industry's desire to keep these agencies from being strong enough
to "take the initiative on more stringent and systemic oversight." Id. at 125. "The smaller the
agency, the easier it was to keep under control," and industry's effort to keep these agencies
small and pliable was aided in large measure by the fact that industrial polluters provided a
large number of the members of the supervisory bodies for these agencies in the 1950s and
1960s. Id. at 125-26.
171 Ripley, supra note 145, at 226. To put this figure into perspective, the annual salary of an
engineer in 1961 ranged from approximately $6,576 to $19,056. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, NATIONAL SURVEY OF PROFESSIONAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, TECHNICAL, AND
CLERICAL PAY: WINTER 1960-61, at 12 (1961), available at http://www.bls.gov/nes/ocs/
patc1960_1961.pdf. Using the Consumer Price Index, $5,000 in 1961 would amount to
approximately $36,400 in 2010 dollars. Measuring Worth, Seven Ways to Compute the Relative
Value of a US. Dollar Amount-1774 to Present, http://www.measuringworth.conV
uscompare/result.php?use%5B%5D=DOLLAR&year-source=1961&amount=5000&yearresult=2
010 (last visited Mar. 20, 2012). A budget of less than $5,000 per year for air pollution control
activities, therefore, could not have supported a functioning program. See Stern, supra note 108,
at 44 (stating that most local jurisdictions that had passed air pollution control ordinances over
the years had failed to provide the organization, personnel, and fiscal means necessary to
implement their ordinances).
172 Ripley, supra note 145, at 226.
173 UEKOETTER, supra note 101, at 13, 150.
174 Id. at 151.
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communities could have been addressed by comprehensive state action."
Unfortunately, however, most states were doing very little. In 1961, only
seventeen states devoted more than $5,000 per year to air pollution control,
and once again, the lion's share of spending was in California. Of the total of
$2 million that these states were spending, California was responsible for
57%. 17 In fact, the states in 1961 had a grand total of 148 full-time and 29 part-
time employees working on air pollution control, and over one-third of them
were in California. 7 In contrast, local programs employed 876 individuals in
1961."17 Furthermore, "[n]ot more than six States, even with a generous
interpretation, could be said to enforce air pollution regulations.""
Los Angeles and the State of California were far and away the leaders in
air pollution control during the post-war period. Los Angeles had never
experienced the smoky conditions that had afflicted so many other
American cities because it relied primarily upon natural gas and fuel oil,
rather than soft coal." Beginning in 1940, however, a new kind of pollution
descended upon the Los Angeles basin-photochemical smog or, as we call
it today, ozone pollution.'"' The smog grew worse as World War II
progressed, often causing thousands to experience eye irritation, sneezing,
and coughing.' Public concern led, first, to the enactment of a city
ordinance in 1944 setting limits on smoke emissions and, then, a nearly
identical county ordinance in 19 4 5 ."3 The county ordinance, however, did
not cover the incorporated cities in the county, and, despite prompting by
the county, many of these cities refused to pass Los Angeles-type
ordinances." Raymond Tucker, the former smoke control chief in St. Louis,
175 Id. at 153. At that time, it was assumed that a city had to have a population of at least
150,000 to be able to afford an air pollution control program. Id.
176 Ripley, supra note 145, at 226.
177 UEKOETTER, supra note 101, at 153.
178 Id. Industrial interests appear to have appreciated the emphasis on local programs at the
time since it was easier for them to exert pressure on local government. Id. at 127. Oregon,
however, was an exception. It enacted the first state air pollution statute in 1951, in part,
perhaps, because industry was concerned about the stringency of a new ordinance that was
under consideration in Portland. See id. (describing how the industry attacked Portland's local
ordinance because they believed it gave officials the power to resort to drastic measures); see
also Report on Air Pollution in Portland, 35 PORTLAND CITY CLUB BULL. 381, 386 (1955), available
at www.pdxcityclub.org/system/files/reports/AirPollution_1955.pdf (explaining that Oregon's
state-wide approach to air pollution was unique).
179 PUBLIC HEALTH SER., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, & WELFARE, STATE AND LOCAL
PROGRAMS IN AIR POLLUTION CONTROL 5 (1966) [hereinafter STATE AND LOCAL PROGRAMS IN AIR
POLLUTION CONTROL].
180 DEWEY, supra note 92, at 27.
181 UEKOETTER, supra note 101, at 187.
182 JAMES E. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND PoLICY: A CASE ESSAY ON CALIFORNIA AND
FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION 1940-1975, at 52-53 (1977). The Los
Angeles basin is an ideal location for ozone pollution since it is ringed by mountains to the east
and north, enjoys prevailing westerly winds from the Pacific, and commonly experiences
temperature inversions that trap cooler air and pollutants beneath a lid of warm air. DEWEY,
supra note 92, at 39.
183 DEWEY, supra note 92, at 41.
184 KRIER & URSIN, supra note 182, at 55.
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was soon brought into town by the Los Angeles Times to review the local
situation, and, early in 1947, he recommended that the state fill this gap by
creating countywide air pollution control agencies." Despite strong
opposition from industrial interests, particularly oil companies and the
railroads, Governor Earl Warren signed a bill into law in 1947 that permitted
every county in California to create an air pollution control district.'8 The
Act also contained two common prohibitions: one directed at nuisances and
the other at dense smoke.' But it also permitted districts to enact additional
requirements consistent with the purposes of the Act.'m
Los Angeles County used its new authority to create a relatively well-
funded Air Pollution Control District (APCD) in the fall of 1947.'" The APCD
set upon its task with vigor. It soon imposed technology-based requirements
on a number of large industrial emitters including iron foundries and open-
hearth steel mills, and required oil storage tanks to have floating roofs. In
addition, by the early 1950s, smoke was curtailed through tough
enforcement of a prohibition on visible emissions; the open burning of
garbage in dumps was banned; and sulfur emissions from oil refineries were
eventually reduced." Despite the city's leadership in air pollution control by
the early 1950s, the smog over Los Angeles was increasing in severity
because its principal source-the automobile-had not been controlled.'2
Although some air pollution control officials in Los Angeles suspected
that auto emissions had something to do with smog, no one knew precisely
how those emissions caused smog. Tucker, therefore, had made no
recommendations about automobiles in his 1947 report on air pollution in
Los Angeles,' and the automobile industry claimed in the same year that
"they had never considered the automobile as capable of producing irritating
gases in objectionable amounts."94 Even though the APCD considered cars
to be only a minor part of the problem, it nevertheless engaged the services
of an obscure biochemistry professor from the California Institute of
Technology, Dr. A. J. Haagen-Smit, whose experiments on smog had
impressed the agency.' Haagen-Smit worked quickly, and in November 1950
he announced his startling conclusion: In the presence of nitrogen oxides (a
product of the high temperature, high compression engines common in post-
185 DEWEY, supra note 92, at 42-43. This was one of 23 recommendations contained in
Tucker's January 1947 report. Id. at 43.
186 KRIER & URSIN, supra note 182, at 61-62.
187 Id at 62.
188 Id
189 DEWEY, supra note 92, at 43-44.
190 Id at 45-46.
191 See id. at 46-47 (describing high levels of eye irritation experienced by residents and
general haze in the city).
192 See id. at 49 (explaining the resistance of residents and the automobile industry to
regulations regarding automobile use).
193 KRIER & URSIN, supra note 182, at 59-60. He did acknowledge, however, that the
automobile was part of the problem. Id. at 59.
194 DEWEY, supra note 92, at 47.
195 KRIER & URSIN, supra note 182, at 79-80.
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war cars) sunlight transformed hydrocarbons-such as gasoline vapor-into
smog.96
Although Haagen-Smit had solved the riddle of ozone pollution, his
work produced a firestorm of controversy. Some of the criticism came from
members of the public who did not relish any blame being placed on the
family car.'97 Much of the criticism, however, came from scientists working
on a grant from the petroleum industry, which had taken particular umbrage
at Haagen-Smit's suggestion that cars and petroleum refineries were equally
responsible for southern California's smog.' These scientists contended
that the problem was much more complex than Haagen-Smit had indicated
and that there was, in fact, a huge void of scientific understanding?" Other,
more independent, scientists eventually examined the question and
corroborated Haagen-Smit's findings, although they found that refineries
were not responsible for as much of the problem as he had originally
thought.200 By 1957, a consensus had emerged: the automobile was the major
cause of smog in Los Angeles.20'
To deal with the problem, the APCD urged the state to pass legislation
to abate motor vehicle pollution.202 The first step was taken in 1959 when the
California legislature passed a bill directing the state's Department of Public
Health to set advisory air quality standards.2 0 Then, in 1960, the California
Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Act was enacted.2n The bill established the
Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Board (MVPCB) within the Department of
Public Health.0 The MVPCB, in turn, was directed to set criteria for
approving exhaust control devices, and once two devices were certified as
meeting those criteria and the advisory air pollution standards, cars were
not to be registered unless they were equipped with a certified device.20' By
1962, a number of crankcase devices had been certified and were required
on all new cars sold in California beginning with the 1964 models .20 Then, in
1964, the MVPCB certified four exhaust devices-three catalytic converters
and one direct flame afterburner 20 8 ne of which would have to be installed
on new 1966 models.* Suddenly, the automobile industry was able to do
something that it had claimed it could not do: produce engine modifications
that yielded better results than these early exhaust devices.2 0 By getting their
own engine modifications certified, the industry was able to avoid installing
196 DEWEY, supra note 92, at 48.
197 See KRIER & URSIN, supra note 182, at 83.
198 Id. at 82.
199 Id at 81-83.
200 Id at 85.
201 Id at 86.
202 Id. at 116-17.
20 Id at 117-18.
204 Id at 138-39.
205 Id. at 138.
206 Id. at 138-39; DEWEY, supra note 92, at 63-64.
207 KRIER & URSIN, supra note 182, at 147.
208 Id at 158.
209 Id
210 Id at 158-59.
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exhaust devices during the next model year."' Nevertheless, it was clear that
California had given birth to a regulatory program that held great promise
for the future.
B. Federal Efforts Prior to 1963
While air pollution was primarily a local concern before the 1960s, the
federal government was not completely missing in action. Federal action,
however, was sporadic and relatively minor before 1955.12 In 1912, for
example, the newly created U.S. Bureau of Mines published several bulletins
that detailed ways to reduce smoke emissions from coal-burning
equipment.213 Its work on air pollution continued in the following years as
the Bureau performed occasional studies and surveys on particular air
pollution problems.2 14 In the 1920s, the U.S. Public Health Service became
alarmed about General Motors' production of tetraethyl lead as an anti-
knock gasoline additive in new high-compression car engines.21 5 The
government wanted proof that human health would not be harmed by its
production and use.2 '6 A conference of experts was held in 1925, production
was voluntarily halted, and further research was performed.m' The panel that
conducted this research concluded, however, that no grounds existed at that
time for banning the use of leaded gasoline, as long as the concentration of
tetraethyl lead did not exceed a specified limit.2 11 Then, during the
Depression, the Works Progress Administration and other New Deal
programs helped perform some of the first comprehensive urban air
pollution surveys, measuring both smoke levels and sootfall.2 m
In the aftermath of the 1948 Donora tragedy,220 federal activity began to
increase. Experts from the U.S. Public Health Service and the U.S. Weather
Bureau investigated the disaster,2" and by 1950, twenty-three other cities had
211 Id
212 See Ripley, supra note 145, at 228-31 (describing the federal government's limited
involvement in air pollution control prior to 1955).
213 Id. at 228. The Bureau of Mines also published a model smoke control ordinance in 1912.
STRADLING, supra note 96, at 97.
214 DEWEY, supra note 92, at 28.
215 Id. at 29.
216 Id
217 Id at 29-30.
218 Id. The research panel, however, recommended that Congress provide funds for further
study to address a number of uncertaipties. Id. The production of the fuel additive resumed,
Congress did not appropriate funds for additional study, and the research that was done was
conducted by the industry and, unsurprisingly, concluded that there was no evidence of any
danger to public health from the use of leaded gasoline. Id.; David Rosner & Gerald Markowitz,
"A Gift of God"? The Public Health Controversy over Leaded Gasoline During the 1920s, in
DYING FOR WORK: WORKERS' SAFETY AND HEALTH IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 121, 135
(David Rosner & Gerald Markowitz eds., 1987).
219 DEWEY, supra note 92, at 28; STRADING, supra note 96, at 159-61.
220 MORAG-LEVINE, supra note 100, at 123, 127.
221 LEONARD B. DWORSKY, CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES: POLLUTION 549 (Frank E.
Smith et al. eds., 1971).
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asked the Public Health Service for assistance in analyzing their local air
pollution problems.222 This heightened level of concern prompted President
Truman to call for the first United States Technical Conference on Air
Pollution.22 The conference, which took place in 1950, urged the federal
government to help identify air pollution problems and to assist in
developing the technology necessary to combat them.224 Nevertheless,
numerous efforts to enact legislation broadening the federal role failed in
Congress between 1949 and 1954.25 Frustrated by this inaction, two
Republican Senators, Thomas Kuchel of California and Homer Capehart of
Indiana,"6 sought help from President Eisenhower, who responded by
appointing an interdepartmental committee in 1954 to explore possible
federal action."' The committee cautiously recommended additional
research and technical assistance, and Eisenhower urged Congress to pass
such legislation in his 1955 State of the Union message." Congress did so
later in 1955.229 The bill, while emphasizing the primary responsibility of state
and local governments for air pollution control, authorized expenditures of
$5 million per year for five years for federal research on air pollution and for
the provision of technical support to state and local agencies.2so Although
Eisenhower's Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Arthur
Flemming, later wanted to expand the federal role to include some limited
222 Id. at 550.
223 MORAG-LEVINE, supra note 100, at 127. President Truman, however, did not envision an
expansive role for the federal government in air pollution control. DEWEY, supra note 92, at 237.
He instead viewed the responsibility for taking corrective action as primarily a matter for local
officials. Id.
224 Ripley, supra note 145, at 228.
225 See DEWEY, supra note 92, at 237 (identifying some of the resistance by President Truman
to addressing this issue); DWORSKY, supra note 221, at 555 (discussing the continued dialog
within Congress about the growing need to control air pollution); Stern, supra note 108, at 49
(outlining the history of several failed bills).
226 Senator Kuchel, of course, was quite familiar with the smog situation in southern
California, while Senator Capehart was concerned about air pollution in Gary and Indianapolis.
DEWEY, supra note 92, at 237.
227 Id. at 238.
228 Samuel M. Rogers, Air Pollution Legislation-A Review of Current Developments, 50 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 642, 642 (1960); Stern, supra note 108, at 49.
229 Act of July 14, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955).
230 Id. §5(a), 69 Stat. at 322-23. Congress, however, only appropriated $16.5 million during
this five-year period. Stern, supra note 108, at 49.
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enforcement authority21 Congress merely extended the 1955 bill for four
additional years in 1959,m and then for two more years in 1962.m
C An Era of "Creative"Federalism: 1963-1970"
In both 1961 and 1962, President Kennedy declared that he supported a
major expansion of federal efforts to control air pollution. 35 Despite the
President's support, passage of a more comprehensive act proved difficult."
In 1963, however, Congress finally succeeded in enacting the Clean Air Act.3 7
The Act greatly expanded the federal budget for air pollution activities,
authorizing the expenditure of $95 million over the next four and one-half
years. Nearly $20 million of this sum could be used as grants to support up
to two-thirds of the cost of initiating or improving state and local air
pollution programS2 3 -thus creating a powerful incentive for state and local
governments to either begin to build or, in some cases, enhance their
capacity in this area.24 0 The Act also increased federal research, training, and
technical services41 and, perhaps most importantly, required the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare to publish air quality criteria for harmful air
pollutants, setting forth the adverse health effects that could be expected
231 Ripley, supra note 145, at 232; KRIER & URSIN, supra note 182, at 110-11, 169 (reporting
Flenmning's proposal at a December 1958 news conference that "the federal government should
be empowered to hold hearings on interstate air pollution on its own initiative and make
findings and recommendations"). The Public Health Service, however, opposed any such
expansion in its power, viewing itself as a research-oriented organization and fearing that such
enforcement authority might disrupt its good relationship with state and local officials. KRIER &
URSIN, supra note 182, at 111; Ripley, supra note 145, at 232-33; Uekoetter, supra note 101, at
217. President Eisenhower, moreover, was not enthusiastic about such mission creep. See
ARNOLD W. REITZE, JR., AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAW: COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 14 (2001)
[hereinafter REITZE, AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAW].
232 Act of Sept. 22, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-365, 73 Stat. 646 (1959). Congress also enacted a bill
in 1960 that required the Surgeon General to study motor vehicle air pollution and report back
to Congress within two years. Act of June 8, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-493,74 Stat. 162 (1960).
233 Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-761, 76 Stat. 760 (1962). The bill also required the
Surgeon General to make the study of motor vehicle exhaust a permanent part of the mission of
the Public Health Service. Id. § 2, 76 Stat. at 760.
234 "Creative" federalism refers to the belief, held by many in the 1960s, that state and local
government would effectively regulate air pollution as long as the federal government would
provide them with funding, support, leadership, and exhortation. JOHN C. ESPOSITO & LARRY J.
SILVERMAN, VANISHING AIR: THE RALPH NADER STUDY GROUP REPORT ON AIR POLLUTION 152
(1970).
235 Ripley, supra note 145, at 235-36.
236 Id. at 236.
237 Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q
(2006)).
238 See id. § 13, 77 Stat. at 401 (authorizing $5 million for fiscal year ending June 30, 1964; $25
million for fiscal year ending June 30, 1965; $30 million for fiscal year ending June 30, 1966; and
$35 million for fiscal year ending June 30, 1967).
239 Id § 4(a), 77 Stat. at 395.
240 See, e.g, infra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
241 § 3, 77 Stat. at 394-95 (1963).
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from various levels of these pollutants.242 In addition, the Act contained the
first provision for federal enforcement. 2 Modeled along the lines of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act,2" the enforcement process was slow
and awkward. Federal enforcement was limited to instances in which human
health or welfare was endangered, and, unless interstate pollution was
involved, it could be triggered only by state or local request.45 The federal
government, furthermore, could not bring suit against a polluter until both a
conference and a public hearing had been held,246 and the court in such a
proceeding was required to consider "the physical and economic feasibility"
of abating the pollution .24  It is, therefore, not surprising that this
enforcement approach proved of limited utility; just ten enforcement
2481conferences ever took place, and only one case went to court.
The 1963 Act was successful in stimulating the growth of local and state
programs. Between 1961 and 1966, for instance, the number of state
programs with budgets of $5,000 per year or more increased from seventeen
to forty, although only nine of these state programs were involved in any
regulatory activities .24 And the number of local programs with budgets of at
least $5,000 per year, increased 50%, from eighty-five to one-hundred thirty,
but less than 20% of the largest counties had air pollution programs.2 0 The
work was only beginning;25' for example, Chicago had fewer air pollution
inspectors in the mid-1960s than in 1910.252 Eventually, in addition to
development and improvement funding, Congress authorized grants to
subsidize the operation of these state and local programs. 25 By 1970, all fifty
242 Id. § 3(c)(2), 77 Stat. at 395. This kind of research would prove of immense value when
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 called upon EPA to set ambient air quality standards in
expedited fashion. Pub. L. No. 91-604, sec. 4 § 109, 84 Stat. 1676, 1679-80 (1790). The air quality
criteria envisioned by the 1963 Act were not binding: they were "acted upon by the states only if
they were so inspired." WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 131 (2d ed. 1994).
243 See § 5, 77 Stat. at 396-99.
244 See William L. Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation: The Congressional Prescnption
for Vigorous Federal Enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202, 210-13
(1987).
245 § 5(c)(1), 77 Stat. at 396.
246 Id § 5(c)-(f), 77 Stat. at 396-98.
247 Id § 5(g), 77 Stat. at 398.
248 ARNOLD W. REITZE, JR., I ENVTL. L. 3-27 (1972); see also DEWEY, supra note 92, at 241-42
(discussing that solitary case); RODGERS, supra note 242, at 133 (concluding that "the
conferences provided little, if any, improvement in air quality").
249 STATE AND LOCAL PROGRAMS IN AIR POLLUTION CONTROL, supra note 179, at 5; see also Jean
J. Schueneman, Organization and Operation of Air Pollution Control Agencies, in 5 AIR
POLLUTION: AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT 109, 137 (Arthur C. Stern ed., 3d ed. 1977) (stating that the
"activities of state agencies in 1965 were rather limited").
250 See STATE AND LOCAL PROGRAMS IN AIR POLLUTION CONTROL, supra note 179, at 7. The
spending by the 50 largest cities in the country averaged less than half of the amount that was
commonly considered an acceptable minimum. Id.
251 By the end of 1966, 72 new program grants had been made along with 40 improvement
grants. Id. at 4.
252 UEKOETrER, supra note 101, at 125.
253 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-675, § 3(a)(1), 80 Stat. 954, 954. Overall
funding for the federal program was increased in 1967, with Congress authorizing the
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states had air pollution programs and the number of local agencies had risen
to 188.25 However, most of these agencies-at both the state and local
level-remained understaffed and underfunded. 255 Half of the state agencies
had fewer than ten budgeted employees in 1969, while half of the local
agencies had fewer than seven budgeted employees.zes In short, it would be
fair to conclude that most state and local programs, even with the
stimulation provided by the federal grants program, were "rudimentary and
ineffectual" in the years before the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970.17
The year 1965 saw the first legislation that gave the federal government
the authority to directly regulate air pollution. The Motor Vehicle Air
Pollution Control Acte ordered the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW) to promulgate emission standards for new vehicles, taking
into consideration technological feasibility and economic costs.2 59 One year
later, HEW set standards-approximately the same as those that California
applied in 1966-to become effective nationwide with the 1968 model year.W
The bill's passage owed much to California, which wanted federal help in its
campaign to curtail automobile-generated pollution."' The automobile
industry on the other hand opposed the bill, arguing that controls should be
set at the state level.62 The industry later changed its mind when an emission
control bill was introduced in Pennsylvania, and a bill even tougher than
California's was introduced in New York. Fearing the proliferation of diverse
state standards, the industry reluctantly endorsed federal regulation as long
as it preempted state efforts.2 The 1965 Act, however, did not explicitly
expenditure of $169 million for 1968-1969 and $134 million for 1970. See Air Quality Act of 1967,
Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 309, 81 Stat. 485, 506-07 (1967).
254 See Stern, supra note 108, at 44 tbl.I (listing the number of municipalities and counties
that had operating air pollution control agencies by 1970 at 107 and 81, respectively). Federal
grants had been extended to over 200 state and local agencies between 1965 (when the first
grants were made) and 1970. SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, THIRD REPORT,
PROGRESS IN THE PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF AIR POLLUTION, S. Doc. No. 91-64, at 20 (1970).
255 MORAG-LEVINE, supra note 100, at 133.
256 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY:
THE FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 85 (1970). Moreover, only 80% of these budgeted positions were
filled, which was primarily due to the low salaries which state and local agencies offered. Id
The problems with regard to staffing reflected budgetary constraints. Only 6 of the 55 state and
territorial programs which had received federal aid actually enjoyed funding which met
minimum standards for adequacy. The funding situation at the local level was somewhat better:
45% of the grantee agencies had budgets that met minimum levels. Id. at 83.
257 DEWEY, supra note 92, at 242; see also RICHARD J. TOBIN, THE SOCIAL GAMBLE 74 (1979)
(reporting that few state programs had adequate staff or monitoring data in the late 1960s);
Robert C. Cluster, State and Local Manpower Resources and Requirements for Air Pollution
Control, 19 J. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL AsS'N 217, 220 (1969) (relating that half of all of the local
air quality personnel in the whole country worked in just five metropolitan areas).
258 Pub. L. No. 89-272, tit. II, 79 Stat. 992 (1965).
259 Id. § 202, 79 Stat. at 992.
260 KRIER & URSIN, supra note 182, at 175.
261 Id. at 173.
262 Id at 173-74.
263 Id. at 174-75. By the mid-1960s, automobile-generated ozone pollution was found in
virtually every urban area in the country. DEWEY, supra note 92, at 228-29.
6552012]1
ENVRONMENTAL IAW
address the question of state preemption, and Congress would not address
the issue for two more years.
The push for greater federal involvement continued. In 1966, John
Gardner, the Secretary of HEW, criticized the states for failing to act more
forcefully and called for uniform national air quality standards and
emissions standards.2 64 Despite the fact that Senator Edmund Muskie, Chair
of the Senate Special Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, opposed
such an increase in federal authority,65 President Johnson sent a message to
Congress in January 1967 recommending legislation that would include
national emission limitations for major industrial sources, and also regional
interstate air quality commissions, where necessary, that would implement
those limits and set air quality standards by which to control other air
pollution sources.26 6 As the Administration's bill went through Congress,
Senator Muskie-still believing in "creative federalism"1 7-attempted to
restore primary responsibility to the states; and with industry support,2 " he
was largely successful. The Air Quality Act of 1967 26 did not provide for
national emission limitations or strong regional air quality standards.
Instead, HEW was directed to delineate air quality control regions, 270 develop
or reevaluate air quality criteria that set forth the impact of particular air
pollutants on health and welfare,27 ' and publish information on
recommended air pollution control technology. 2 The states, rather than
HEW, were then called upon to set ambient air quality standards for their air
quality control regions and to adopt a plan for the implementation of those
standards.7  In addition to adding more funding," the Act also provided for
275direct federal civil enforcement action in emergency situations.
264 DEWEY, supra note 92, at 240. According to Professors Krier and Ursin, "state and local
efforts had been relatively scant" to date. KRIER & URSIN, supra note 182, at 179.
265 See DEWEY, supra note 92, at 240-41; KRIER & URSIN, supra note 182, at 180. Muskie
believed that national standards would impair growth in poorer states and that the federal
government should focus its efforts on those areas that were seriously polluted. See DEWEY,
supra note 92, at 240; KRIER & URSIN, supra note 182, at 180.
266 Special Message to the Congress: Protecting our Natural Heritage, 1 PUB. PAPERS 93, 94-
95 (Jan. 30, 1967). With regard to national emission limits, President Johnson wrote:
Today, no such [emission control] levels exist. Industries do not know to what extent
they should control their sources of pollution or what will be required of them in the
future. Strong State and local standards-essential to pollution control-cannot be
effective if neighboring states and cities do not have strong standards of their own. Nor
can such local standards gain the support of industry and the public, unless they know
that plants in adjoining communities must also meet standards at least as strict. Id. at 94.
267 See DEWEY, supra note 92, at 242.
268 See KRIER & URSIN, supra note 182, at 180. The concept of national emission standards,
however, received a surprising level of support from state and local organizations. Id.
269 Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967).
270 Id. § 107(a), 81 Stat. at 490-91.
271 Id § 107(b)(1), 81 Stat. at 491. Senator Jennings Randolph of West Virginia, therefore, was
successful in his and the coal industry's effort to force HEW to reconsider the previously issued
criteria for sulfur dioxide. See KRIER & URSIN, supra note 182, at 180-81, 183.
272 § 107(c), 81 Stat. at 491.
273 Id § 108(c)(1), 81 Stat. at 492.
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Perhaps the most contentious issue involved the preemption of state
motor vehicle emission standards. Despite California's desire that the
federal standards would only set a minimum floor level for the nation,
permitting states to be more stringent, the Senate version of the bill only
contained an exemption for California, and only if the state could show that
the more stringent standard was necessary.2 76 In the House, Representative
John Dingell of Detroit attempted to eliminate the exemption altogether."
Lobbying by California, however, overcame his opposition, and the House
eventually passed an even broader exemption. 7" Following conference with
the Senate, the House version was enacted into law.2 9 While national motor
vehicle emission standards would normally preempt state law, HEW was
directed to waive preemption for more stringent California standards, unless
HEW could demonstrate that the standards were not necessary to meet
compelling and extraordinary conditions.2""
As the 1960s came to a close, air pollution control remained primarily in
state and local hands with the notable exception of motor vehicle emissions.
The public's patience with this approach, however, was growing short&'
There was "no clear evidence that pollution was being reduced on a broad
national scale,"m and there was increasing skepticism about the ability and
willingness of state or local government to take the action necessary to
improve air quality. While some progress had been made, much more
274 Id. § 105(a)-(c), 81 Stat. at 489-90.
275 See id. § 108(k), 81 Stat. at 497 (permitting the Attorney General to bring suit to enjoin
sources of pollution when those sources present an "imminent and substantial endangerment to
the health of persons" and state and local authorities have not acted to abate the pollution).
276 KRIER & URSIN, supra note 182, at 181.
277 Id at 181-82.
278 Id. at 182.
279 Id. at 183-84.
280 Id at 184; § 208(b), 81 Stat. at 501 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (2006)).
Congress permitted other states to follow California's lead in 1977. Once California obtains a
waiver, other states with nonattainment problems may now, as a result of the 1977
amendments, adopt California's standard. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95,
§ 177, 91 Stat. 685, 750 (1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (2006)).
281 See ALLEN V. KNEESE & CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 51
(1975); ESPOSITO & SILVERMAN, supra note 234, at 23; DEWEY, supra note 92, at 241-42; KRIER &
URSIN, supra note 182, at 200.
282 KNEESE & SCHULTZE, supra note 281, at 51.
283 See KRIER & URSIN, supra note 182, at 201; see also ESPOSITO & SILVERMAN, supra note 234,
at 190-233 (describing the sad state of air pollution control in Houston, New York City, and
Washington D.C. at the end of the 1960s).
284 Progress, for example, had been made in New York City. Although it was considered the
dirtiest city in the nation in the mid-1960s and suffered 168 deaths during an air inversion in
1966, significant efforts to address the problem were made during the administration of Mayor
John V. Lindsay. DEWEY, supra note 92, at 131-33. By switching to the use of lower sulfur coal
and oil and by installing some particulate control equipment, Consolidated Edison appears to
have reduced sulfur dioxide and particulate matter emissions from its old, outmoded power
plants located in the City (its plan to retire some of these facilities and import more electricity
from new facilities outside of the City had been delayed). ESPOSITO & SILVERMAN, supra note
234, at 213, 216. But the level of air pollution in 1970 remained the worst in the country because
of, among other things, the continued operation of thousands of smoky oil furnaces, thousands
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remained to be done due to the "paucity" of air pollution regulation at the
local and state level."' The processes set in motion by the Air Quality Act,
moreover, appeared to be too slow and too weak.2" Stronger action, many
believed, was needed.27
The Clean Air Amendments of 1970288 ushered in a dramatic new age in
air pollution control. The era of "creative" federalism was over, and with its
demise came a major expansion of federal authority. Instead of air quality
standards being set by the states, the newly created EPA2 89 was given the
responsibility to set tough standards designed to protect public health.29 0 The
states, in turn, were called upon to implement these standards through
federally-approved implementation plans containing emissions limitations,
compliance timetables, and monitoring requirements. 29' New sources of air
pollutants were required to meet uniform technology-based limitations that
were to be established by EPA, although the program could be implemented
pursuant to federally approved state plans.9 A similar assignment of federal-
state responsibilities was set forth for new health-based standards
applicable to hazardous air pollutants.292 Finally, the 1970 amendments gave
of antiquated incinerators, and the failure of efforts to deal effectively with the interstate
aspects of air pollution in the New York metropolitan area. DEWEY, supra note 92, at 133-34,
171-72. New York City was not typical, however-its Department of Air Resources was among
the best in the country, enjoying a per capita budget twice the size of the national average.
ESPOSITO & SILVERMAN, supra note 234, at 230.
285 R. M. Dobbins, Legal Aspects ofAir Pollution, in AIR POLLUTION CONTRQL: GUIDEBOOK FOR
MANAGEMENT 188 (A. T. Rossano, Jr. ed., 1971); see also GEORGE H. HAGEVIK, DECISION-MAKING
IN AIR POLLUTION CONTROL: A REVIEW OF THEORY AND PRACTICE 14 (1970) (concluding that, "[iun
the past, efforts at air quality control have been given low priority by most local governments").
Even in cities such as Pittsburgh, which had enjoyed some regulatory success, "[tihe 61an of the
early [smoke control] period, when considerable success was possible with little effort and
expense, had by now largely evaporated." UEKOETrER, supra note 101, at 234.
286 See DAVIES & DAVIES, supra note 146, at 52-53; WALTER A. ROSENBAUM, THE POuTICS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN 155 (1973); cf UEKOETTER, supra note 101, at 234 (noting the
difficulties faced in setting air pollution controls during the 1960s). By February 1969, HEW had
issued air quality criteria for only two pollutants, and HEW was setting a slow pace in
designating air quality control regions. TOBIN, supra note 257, at 72-73. The states, partially as a
result of delays at HEW, were slow in submitting their implementation plans, but even the plans
they did submit contained many deficiencies. Id. at 74-75.
287 See KRIER & URSIN, supra note 182, at 200; ROSENBAUM, supra note 286, at 157; see also
REITZE, AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAW, supra note 231, at 15-16.
288 Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
289 Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (Oct. 6, 1970), reprintedin 5 U.S.C.
app. 643 (2006), andin 84 Stat. 2086 (1970) (effective Dec. 2, 1970).
290 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, sec. 4(a), § 109, 84 Stat. at 1679 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2006)).
291 Id. sec. 4(a), § 110, 84 Stat. at 1680 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006)). The
budget for clean air activities was substantially increased. A total of $650 million was authorized
for the next three years, id. sec. 13(a), § 316, 84 Stat. at 1709, with state agencies eligible for
grants to develop, improve, and maintain their programs. Id. sec. 3(a), § 105, 84 Stat. at 1677.
Another $365 million was authorized for research over the following three-year period. See id
sec. 13(a), § 316, 84 Stat. at 1709.
292 Id. sec. 4(a), § 111, 84 Stat. at 1683 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006)).
293 Id. sec. 4(a), §,112, 84 Stat. at 1685-86. In 1990, Congress replaced the chemical by
chemical, health-based approach found in the 1970 amendments with a new regulatory scheme
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EPA substantial power to enforce the Act through administrative relief, civil
action, and criminal sanctions-although the states retained concurrent
authority to enforce their own plans and requirements.29 So, while the states
still had important roles to play, their significance had certainly been
diminished."o The federal government was now charged with the
promulgation of a wide array of. new regulatory requirements and the
difficult task of overseeing their implementation."
predicated upon the maximum achievable control technology found in a particular industrial
category. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (2006). If those standards do not adequately reduce human
health risks, EPA is directed to deal with the residual risk by setting health-based limits that
also take into consideration costs and other relevant factors. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f) (2006).
.294 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, sec. 4(a), § 113, 84 Stat. at 1686-87 (giving expanded
enforcement authority to EPA) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (2006)); id. sec. 4(c),
§ 116, 84 Stat. at 1689 (giving concurrent enforcement authority to the states) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2006)).
295 Although the 1970 act preempted less stringent state and local requirements, the act
provided them with the latitude to adopt limitations and other requirements that are more
stringent than federal law with regard to stationary sources of air pollution. See id. sec. 4(c),
§ 116, 84 Stat. at 1689 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2006)).
296 A variety of new programs and refinements were enacted in 1977. See e.g., Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, sec. 127(a), 91 Stat. at 731-42 (adding provisions for the
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) of air quality in areas attaining the National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479
(2006)); id. sec. 129(b), 91 Stat. at 745-51 (adding provisions pertaining to areas failing to attain
compliance with NAAQS) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-15 (2006)). The Act was
again amended in 1990. See, e.g., Act of Nov. 15, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, sec. 401, 104 Stat. at
2584-631 (establishing the acid deposition control program, also known as the acid rain
program) (codified at 42 U.S.C §§ 7651-7651o (2006)); id. sections 102-106, 104 Stat. at 2412-64
(amending and extending provisions pertaining to areas failing to attain compliance with
NAAQS) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-75 (2006)); id sec. 301, 104 Stat. at 2531-74
(amending provision applying to hazardous air pollutants) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412 (2006)); id. sec. 501, 104 Stat. at 2635-48 (creating a major new permit program) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661-7661f (2006)); id. §§ 601-602, 104 Stat. at 2648-70 (creating a
program for stratospheric ozone protection) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671-7671q
(2006)). Some have asserted that the statutes like the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 "were
a natural outgrowth of a lawmaking process which began at least a decade earlier at the state
level." E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory
Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 318 (1985). The
1970 Clean Air Amendments, however, appear to have owed much more to the pioneering
efforts made at the local level over the course of many years and to the rather steady evolution
in federal involvement during the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, the federal government appears to
have stepped into a regulatory void, which had resulted from state inaction. The local agencies
that had grown out of the smoke abatement movement possessed neither the sophistication nor
the jurisdiction necessary to deal with modern air pollution problems, and the states seem to
have lacked both the will and the means to fill the gap. See UEKOETrER, supra note 101, at 13-
14, 153. Clearly, however, the 1970 Amendments marked a distinctly new path forward.
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III. AN EXAMINATION OF THE CLAIMS FOR STATE
REGULATORY SUCCESS PRIOR TO 1970
A. The Claims
In 2001, Professor Richard Revesz published a controversial article that
attempted to refute the conventional view that the primary engine of
environmental regulation ought to be at the federal level due to a number of
public choice pathologies that encumber effective regulation at the state
level."' In doing so, he took issue with the claim that the states had been
ineffective environmental regulators prior to the environmental decade of
the 1970s."' His argument cited three studies dealing with air pollution,
which he claimed suggested that the "states [had] responded vigorously to
those air pollution problems that were understood at the time."2 In 2005,
Professor Jonathan Adler cited the same three studies as "evidence of
significant environmental improvement prior to the adoption of federal
environmental regulation."" He then went further and suggested that the
record provides "ample reason to question the assumption that lessening
federal environmental regulatory authority necessarily results in lessened
environmental protection."n"
Robert Crandall of the Brookings Institution authored the earliest study
upon which both Revesz and Adler relied.o2 Crandall used EPA monitoring
data that had been reported by the Conservation Foundation in 1982.33 The
data was drawn from ninety-five monitoring sites for total suspended
particulate matter304 between 1960 and 1971 and from thirty-two sites for
sulfur dioxide concentrations from 1964 to 1971. According to this data, the
297 Revesz, Federalism and En vironmental Regulation, supra note 35, at 555-57.
298 Id at 578-83.
299 Id. at 580-82.
300 Adler, Judicial Federalism, supra note 35, at 465-66.
301 Id. at 464-65 (emphasis omitted).
302 CRANDALL, supra note 39; see also Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation,
supra note 35, at 580; Adler, Judicial Federalism, supra note 35, at 466.
303 CRANDALL, supra note 39, at 17-19 (citing CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, STATE OF THE
ENVIRONMENT 1982, at 50-54 (1982)). This EPA data had been reported by the agency on at least
two occasions in WILLIAM F. HUNT, JR. & EDWARD J. LILLIS, OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING &
STANDARDS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 1980 AMBIENT ASSESSMENT-AIR PORTION 2-1 to 2-7 (1981);
and U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 1 THE NATIONAL AIR MONITORING PROGRAM: AIR QUALITY AND
EMISSIONS TRENDS ANNUAL REPORT 1-10 to 1-12 (1973) [hereinafter EPA, 1973 AIR QUALITY
TRENDS REPORT], available athttp://www.epagov/airtrends/pdfs/Trends-Report_1973.pdf.
30 Monitoring for total suspended particulate matter measured particulate matter of up to 25
im to 40 pim in size. THAD GODISH, AIR QUAUTY 60 (4th ed. 2004). EPA replaced the total
suspended particulate matter air quality standards in 1987 with PM,0 , 52 Fed. Reg. 24,663, 24,664
(July 1, 1987) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 50.6 (2011)), and standards forPM2were added in 1997. 62
Fed. Reg. 38,711 (July 18, 1997) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 50.7 (2011)). The total suspended
particulate matter standards included particles that were too large to enter the human
respiratory system; thus, they were not well calibrated to a health-based regulatory program.
See GODISH, supra, at 222. By contrast, the PMo standards and monitors apply to particles that
can enter the thoracic region of the respiratory system, and the PM, standards and monitors
apply to materials that can be deposited deep into human lung tissue. See id at 60.
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average concentration of particulate matter fell 2.3% per year in the 1960s,
and sulfur dioxide concentrations fell at an annual rate of 11.3% from 1964 to
1971.m While Crandall admitted that the data was "fragmentary" and not
very reliable,3 he nevertheless declared that they revealed an "interesting
trend""7 that suggested "[a] system of state air pollution policies could have
been equally or more effective" than a federal program?38
In 1990, Paul Portney of Resources for the Future picked up on the
same EPA data.3m Despite his cautions that one "must be leery of trends
based on such a small number of sites," he declared that the data was
"important" since it indicated that, rather than deteriorating, air quality was
actually improving before the 1970 Amendments were enacted.3 1 o The data,
according to Portney, called into question the notion "that states and local
governments would never impose the controls necessary to achieve
healthful air.""' While acknowledging that it was "arguable whether local
governments acting alone" could actually have made progress after 1970, he
urged that the "accomplishments" of state and local authorities "prior to
1970 should not be ignored."012
Finally, Indur Goklany, currently a policy analyst with the U.S.
Department of the Interior, published a book in 1999 that largely focused on
pre-1970 air pollution trends.1 3 With respect to particulates and sulfur
dioxide, he reported, in part, on the same data that Portney and Crandall
used.31' Goklany, however, added more data to the mix. This data was
apparently generated by the Mitre Corporation from raw EPA monitoring
data and was reported by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) in
1971.311 The data for particulates included one set for sixty urban sites from
305 CRANDALL, supra note 39, at 19.
306 Id.
307 Id
308 Id. at 21. Crandall's primary point involved a comparison between monitoring data
collected in the 1960s and data collected in the 1970s, a comparison which, he argued,
suggested that "pollution reduction was more effective in the 1960s, before there was a serious
federal policy dealing with stationary sources, than since the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments."
Id. at 19. His analysis, however, is undermined by the fact that the monitoring sites relied upon
for the comparison were not held constant (in fact, the number of sites in the 1970s rose from
less than 100 to several thousand) and, as he noted, by the poor quality of monitoring data
during both periods. See id. at 17, 19, 21, 26-27.
309 Portney, supra note 39, at 50-51. He looked, however, at a slightly different sample from
this data base: total suspended particulate matter data for 95 sites from 1960 to 1970 and sulfur
dioxide data for 31 sites from 1966 to 1971. Id. at 50.
310 Id at 50-51.
311 Id. at 51.
312 Id
313 GOKLANY, supra note 39, at 1-2.
314 Id. at 55-56 (reporting on 95 sites for particulate matter for the period 1960-1971, and 32
sites for 1964-1971).
315 See CoUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, EXEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY: SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 212-17, 241-43 (1971) [hereinafter CEQ, SECOND ANNUAL
REPORT], avalable at http://www.slideshare.net/whitehouse/august-1971-the-first-annual-report-
of-the-council-on-environmental-quality. Some of this data appears to have formed the basis of
another report published in 1971. See Robert Spirtas & Howard J. Levin, Patterns and Trends in
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1957 to 1970 and twenty rural sites from 1958 to 1970. According to this data,
particulate emissions fell from 121 pg/m3 to 102 pg/m3 in the urban areas, and
rose from 23 pg/m' to 37 pg/m' in the rural areas.' To counter the rural data,
Goklany also mentioned the existence of EPA data from eighteen non-urban
monitoring stations for the period of 1960 to 1971 that revealed no overall
trend because a decline early in the period was offset by an increase from
1968 to 1971 that "may have been attributable to decreased rainfall."17 He
also mentioned sulfur dioxide data that was found in the 1971 CEQ report.
Based on that data from twenty-one urban monitoring stations, Goklany
reported that the mean annual concentration had dropped about 40%, from
69.4 pg/m3 in 1962 to 42.5 pg/m in 1969.3' All of this empirical data
demonstrated, according to Goklany, that there had been "broad
improvements in air quality before federalization" and that the
improvements in total suspended particulates and sulfur dioxide "were
especially noticeable in urban . .. areas.""
Goklany appears to have recognized that there may be some problems
with this data. He stated, for instance, that monitoring stations are not
always representative of broader conditions and that meteorological
conditions, such as variable rainfall from year to year, can cast doubt on
trend analyses.32 0 He also discussed a number of economic and technological
developments, such as the switch from coal to natural gas by many urban
homeowners and the switch from coal to diesel fuel by the nation's
railroads, as important factors in reducing smoke concentrations in many
American cities.32' Nevertheless, he declared that state and local regulations
were responsible for improving urban sulfur dioxide levels in the 1960s,322
and partially responsible for improvements in urban particulate levels in the
1950s and 1960s.323 The impact of state and local regulation, combined with
the rapid growth in the number of state and local air programs during the
1960s, indicate, according to Goklany, that "the race-to-the-bottom rationale
Levels ofSuspended Particulate Matter, 21 J. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL Ass'N 329, 329-30 (1971)
(reporting on particulate matter trends at 58 central city locations from 1957 to 1966 and 20
non-urban sites from 1958 to 1966).
316 GOKIANY, supra note 39, at 54.
317 Id. at 54-55. This data is found in EPA, 1973 AIR QUALITY TRENDS REPORT, supra note 303,
at 4-9.
318 GoKLANY, supra note 39, at 56. The actual decline reported by CEQ, however, was
somewhat less significant since the 1962 figure was actually 66.4 pg/m', not 69.4 pg/m, which
was the reported figure for 1963. See CEQ, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 315,
at 242 tbl.A-1.
319 GoKLANY, supra note 39, at 150. With regard to particulate concentrations, he declared
that "the worst [urban] areas were getting better long before the 1970 Clean Air Act was passed
or became effective." Id at 55. Goldany also reported on sparse pre-1970 monitoring data
dealing with carbon monoxide, ozone, and lead, but his primary focus was on particulate matter
and sulfur dioxide concentrations. See id. at 56-62, 65, 111, 113.
320 Id. at 50-51.
321 Id at 21.
322 Id at 78.
323 Id at 83.
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is intrinsically flawed."a Thus, any "devolution of air pollution.control to the
states [would be] unlikely to result in rollback of the air quality
improvements of the past few decades."a
B. A Closer Look at the Air Qualty Data upon Which the Claims Are Based
The data that all these commentators rely on provides no support upon
which to draw broad conclusions about the effectiveness of state and local
regulation or to spin theories about the likely consequences of devolving
significant regulatory authority to the states.
The original source of the data that was primarily relied upon by all of
these commentators326 appeasS to have been an EPA air quality trends report
that was published in 1973.327 According to the report, the composite average
of total suspended particulate matter decreased from approximately 110
pg/m& in 1960 to 85 pg/m3 in 1971, a drop of about 20%, at a group of ninety-
five urban monitoring stations.32 For sulfur dioxide, the drop in the
composite average at thirty-two urban monitoring stations was over 50%,
from 55 pg/mn in 1964 to approximately 25 pg/m3 in 1971.32' The non-urban
particulate trends were drawn from eighteen monitoring sites between 1960
and 1971 and revealed no significant change.3o All of the data came from
EPA's National Air Surveillance Network (NASN) sites.nl
The urban NASN sites were located in central business districts at
locations that were as comparable as possible to sites in other cities. 3' No
more than one site was located in any city,m a fact that casts significant
doubt on the representative nature of the data. As the CEQ noted in its
report on NASN data, "differences in site location will result in major
differences in reported concentrations." m In fact, many readings from non-
NASN sites, often downwind from major polluters, were "higher by an order
324 Id. at 151.
325 Id. at 153. He added, however, that "in light of the progress made, and given that the
easy-and several tough-reductions have already been made, further improvements in air
quality may not be sustainable if they come at the expense of the broader quality of life." Id.
326 The additional report upon which Goklany also relied will be discussed infra, in the text
accompanying notes 352-57.
327 EPA, 1973 AIR QUALITY TRENDS REPORT, supra note 303.
328 Id. at 1-8 to 1-9.
329 See id. at 1-8, 1-10.
330 Id at 4-9.
331 Id. at 1-9 fig. 1-1, 1-10 fig. 1-2. The NASN network was originally established as the National
Air Sampling Network by the U.S. Public Health Service in 1957, and the scope of operations
grew gradually through the 1960s. By 1967, the number of operating urban stations had grown
to 127 in 1967, while the number of operating rural stations had risen to 30. See PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, AIR QUALITY DATA FROM THE NATIONAL
AIR SURVEILLANCE NETWORKS 1967 EDITION 1 (1969) [hereinafter HEW, AIR QUALITY DATA].
332 HEW, AIR QUALITY DATA, supra note 33. Id. at 17.
333 EPA, 1973 AIR QUALITY TRENDS REPORT, supra note 303, at 1-8, 4-4. Since only one monitor
was located in a metropolitan area, "the central city site [seemed to be] the obvious choice."
Spirtas & Levin, supra note 315, at 332.
334 CEQ, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 315, at 243.
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of magnitude" than downtown NASN data, "especially for gaseous
pollutants" such as sulfur dioxide .3 " Therefore, as EPA stressed, "it should
not be assumed that the selected site was representative of the urban area as
a whole,"a especially for the worst-case scenarios found in "heavily
industrialized portions of many cities."" The non-urban monitoring stations,
eighteen in total across the entire nation, were generally located in parks,m
and thus do not appear to be representative of either rural or suburban areas
with pollution problems. Data, moreover, was often missing. The EPA report
chose to analyze a subset of ninety-five monitoring stations for particulates
because they were the only stations that had at least one data point in each
three-year period spanning the twelve-year scope of the overall project3"
Consequently, the particulate data may not reflect substantial spikes or
declines that may have occurred in those years in which the data is missing.
The sampling protocols, moreover, were not especially rigorous in those
early days. The NASN stations operated on only twenty-six randomly
selected days per year.o In the early 1970s, EPA increased the minimum
frequency of sampling for particulates and sulfur dioxide to once every six
days, for a total of sixty days per year."
The validity of this data, therefore, is highly suspect. The number of
sampling locations was extremely small; they were not necessarily
representative of either urban or non-urban areas; the data was often
incomplete; the periods of time analyzed were not extensive; and the
sampling methodology at the time was crude compared to modem
monitoring standards." EPA admitted as much when it wrote "that the
difficulties in generating valid trend analyses at this time are due ... to the
incompleteness and uncertainties that pervade the available data base."43 An
additional problem affecting the reliability of this data was the possible
impact of weather, especially precipitation, upon the readings taken at the
monitoring stations. EPA explained in its 1973 report that rainfall can
remove pollutants from the air by processes such as absorption, coagulation,
335 Id
336 EPA, 1973 AIR QUALTY TRENDS REPORT, supra note 303, at 1-8.
337 Id at 4-4.
338 CEQ, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 315, at 243. One such location, in fact, was
Cape Hatteras. EPA, 1973 AIR QUALITY TRENDS REPORT, supra note 303, at 4-9.
339 EPA, 1973 AIR QUAUTY TRENDS REPORT, supra note 303, at 4-8 to 4-9.
340 HEW, AIR QUAUTY DATA, supra note 331, at 17.
341 See 40 C.F.R. § 51.17 (1972). The possibility of missing high-concentration days is
increased with less frequent monitoring schedules. See Brian Rumburg et al., Statistical
Distributions of Pariculate Matter and the Error Associated with Sampling Frequency, 35
ATMOSPHERIC ENV'T 2907, 2908, 2919 (2001).
342 Standardized criteria for sampling heights, for example, were not available at this time.
Therefore, "[m]easurements are .. . often made at roof level where pollutant concentrations
may be higher or lower than actual representative levels according to the relative height or
nearby emission sources." EPA, 1973 AIR QUALITY TRENDS REPORT, supra note 303, at D-6.
343 Id at 1-7 to 1-8. According to EPA, the problem with the monitoring program in these
early years was due to several factors including "geographical, spatial, and temporal sampling
maldistribution, inconsistencies in sampling and analytic methods, lack of systematic validation
of acquired data, and insufficieiit monitoring resources." Id. at 2-3.
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and washout?' In addition, the agency noted that dry conditions can
increase particulate concentrations, a problem especially in arid areas of the
American West.3 The report, moreover, pointed to lower rainfall levels in
certain places, namely in portions of the West and New England, as one
reason to explain why certain non-urban monitoring stations in those
regions reported upward trends in particulate levels during the last four
years of the 1960-1971 monitoring period.4 EPA, however, did not attempt
to explain how a major, widespread drought that lasted for six years in the
early to mid-1960s might have affected this data.
Widespread drought conditions afflicted the Northeast, Middle Atlantic,
MVidwest, and Central states beginning in 1961, and those conditions
continued through 1966.4' That fact may have affected the data from many
of the monitoring locations that were used in establishing these trends by
producing higher ambient concentrations early in the period and lower
concentrations once the drought ended at the end of the 1960s. Without
additional empirical work, it is impossible to quantify what effect this
drought may have had on EPA's report, but it is certainly possible that the
drought skewed many of the data points upward early in the period, thus
contributing, for example, to what was reported as a dramatic fall in sulfur
dioxide levels between 1964 and 1971."8 Perhaps, the best thing one can say
about this report is that it served as an early, and unfortunately, a rather
rickety "prototype" for future efforts to analyze air quality trends49 EPA was
thus absolutely correct in cautioning that the inadequacies of the "data base
must of necessity limit the degree of confidence that can be placed on
interpretations derived from it."a5
Goklany cited additional data, which he gleaned from the 1971 CEQ
report, covering a slightly longer period of time, from the late 1950s to 1970
for particulates and 1962 to 1969 for sulfur dioxide. This data, however,
suffers from the same infirmities. It covered only'slightly different reporting
periods and was generally based on even fewer monitoring locations.3 5' The
data came from the same monitoring system, EPA's NASN system. 52 The
urban sites, therefore, were also located in central business districts-sites
344 Id at D-6, 2-3. EPA added that other weather factors like wind, humidity, and temperature
can affect monitoring results. Id. at 4-11 to 4-13.
345 See id., at D-6.
346 Id. at 4-11 (stating that "decreased moisture from rainfall may increase particulate matter
entrained into the atmosphere from the surface and may decrease the chances for rainfall
removal of airborne particulates").
347 STODDARD ET AL., supra note 51.
348 See EPA, 1973 AIR QUAUTY TRENDS REPORT, supra note 303, at 1-8 to 1-12, fig. 1-6.
349 EPA, 1973 AIR QuAUTY TRENDS REPORT, supra note 303, at 2-3. The agency wrote that it
hoped that its efforts would "eventually evolve into a truly complete and reliable
representation" of trends in air quality. Id.
350 Id
351 See supra Part I.A and text accompanying notes 318-20.
352 CEQ, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 315, at 243. In fact, it is quite likely that the




that were often not representative of conditions in those urban areasse-and
the non-urban sites were generally located in parks.'" Data was also missing
for some of the sixty urban and twenty non-urban sites that were relied upon
to establish trends for suspended particulate matter."' The complexities of
weather, especially the 1961-1966 drought; inconsistent and often crude
monitoring methods; and the lack of systematic validation of acquired data 6
are all problems that cast doubt on the reliability of the CEQ data and any
conclusions drawn from them. While it is certainly possible that some
measures of air.pollution were improving in a number of central city areas,
we simply have no empirically valid data indicating that air quality was
improving in any uniform fashion-either in metropolitan areas or more
broadly-prior to 1970.
IV. A CLEARER PICTURE EMERGES
A. Trends in Air Pollution Emissions and Energy Consumption
Since the early 1970s, EPA has published estimates of annual air
pollution emissions in an effort to gauge historic trends in pollutant
emissions.3 Although EPA has improved the methodology used in
estimating emissions in the years since 1984,as the data from 1940 to 1984
are based on national "top-down" estimates drawn from aggregate national
economic and demographic data."' The accuracy of the pre-1973 data,
therefore, is limited, and the data do not provide an absolute indication of
emissions for any particular year.O Nevertheless, an examination of
emissions data may prove helpful at least to the extent that the data appear
to be validated by other measures such as energy consumption and what we
know about pollution control practices before 1970.
According to EPA's estimates, national sulfur dioxide enssions rose
from approximately 22 million tons in 1960 to over 31 million tons in 1970,3"1
an increase of 40%." While only an estimate, it is consistent with the fact
35 According to Spirtas and Levin, "[njo inference about increases or decreases in pollution
in an entire metropolitan area can be made from suspended particulate data from the single
center-city site [that was the source of this urban NASN data]." Spirtas & Levin, supm note 315,
at 332.
354 CEQ, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, sipra note 315, at 243.
355 Id. at 242.
356 See supra notes 343-52 and accompanying text.
357 See, e.g., OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING & STANDARDS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
NATIONAL AIR POLLUTANT EMISSION TRENDS, 1900 - 1998 (2000) [hereinafter EPA, AIR POLLUTANT
EMISSION TRENDS].
35 Id. at 1-2 to 1-3.
35 Id. at 1-3.
360 Id. at 1-2.
361 See id. at 3-12 tbl.3-4.
362 Most of this increase occurred among sources that either were not located in central city
areas or discharged pollutants through tall stacks. COMM'N ON NAT'L RESOURCES, NAT'L ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES, AIR QUALITY AND STATIONARY SOURCE EMISSION CONTROL, S. Doc. NO. 94-4, at 239
tbl.6-2, 240 (1975).
666 Vol. 42:627
2012] OF FABLES AND FEDERALISM 667
that coal consumption increased from 398 million tons in 1960 to 523 million
tons in 1970,3 an increase of 31%.4 At the same time, the use of fuel oil to
produce electricity in the United States grew nearly fourfold." It therefore
appears fair to say that sulfur dioxide pollution, rather than improving
dramatically, actually grew much worse during the 1960s, a conclusion that
correlates with the near absence of any effort by industry to control sulfur
dioxide emissions. For example, relatively few fossil fuel-fired electric
generating stations, responsible for approximately half of national sulfur
dioxide emissions in 1970,36 had taken any steps by 1970 to reduce these
emissions." Similarly, there was little control of sulfur dioxide emissions at
the approximately 307,000 industrial boilers in operation across the United
States."
By contrast, EPA has estimated that national particulate matter
emissions (PMo) peaked in 1950-falling from over 17 million tons in 1950 to
slightly over 13 million tons in 1970, a drop of 23%.3' This decline
corresponds with a fall in particulate emissions from the residential-
commercial sector of 73%,70 and a drop of nearly 99% in the railroad sector,"
declines which appear consistent with the continuing switch from coal to
natural gas and fuel oil by households and commercial concerns,7 ' and from
363 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2010, at 217 tbl.7.3
(2011) [hereinafter DOE, 2010 ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW], available at http://205.254.135.24/
totalenergy/data/annual/pdflaer.pdf.
364 Between 1940 and 1970, sulfur dioxide emissions from electric utility plants doubled
every decade as a result of increased coal burning. By 1970, coal combustion accounted for over
90% of the sulfur dioxide emitted by the electrical utility industry. EPA, AIR POLLUTANT EMISSION
TRENDS, supra note 357, at 3-12 tbl.3-4.
365 See DOE, 2010 ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW, supra note 363, at 163 tbl.5.13d (citing an
increase from 241,000 barrels per day in 1960 to 928,000 barrels per day in 1970). Fuel oils used
in power plants vary in sulfur content from less than 0.5% to over 4%, compared with coal,
which varies from about 0.5% to more than 5% sulfur. F. E. Gartrell, Power Generation, in 4 AIR
POLLUTION: AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT 465, 483 (Arthur C. Stern ed., 3d ed. 1977).
366 EPA, AIR POLLUTANT EMISSION TRENDS, supra note 357, at 3-12 tbl.34.
367 R. D. Ross, AIR POLLUTION AND INDUSTRY 220 (1972). To the extent this was done, it was
generally accomplished by substituting lower sulfur content fuel. Id.; see also supra text
accompanying note 284 (discussing actions by Consolidated Edison in New York City). Only
three generating units at electric power stations across the entire country were scheduled to
have sulfur dioxide scrubbing systems in place before 1971. 1 HANDBOOK OF ENVTL. CONTROL:
AIR POLLUTION 556 tbl.4.5-14 (Richard B. Bond et al. eds., 1972).
368 RoSS, supra note 367, at 213.
369 EPA, AIR POLLUTANT EMISSION TRENDS, supra note 357, at 3-13 tbl.3-5. EPA estimates that
15.5 million tons were emitted in 1960. Id.
370 See id. (reporting a fall from nearly 1.7 million tons in 1950 to less than half a million tons
in 1970). The decline between 1960 and 1970 was 59%, representing a fall from 1.1 million tons
to less than half a million tons in 1970. Id.
371 See id. (reporting a drop from over 1.7 million tons in 1950 to 25,000 tons in 1970). The
fall between 1960 and 1970 was 77 percent, from 110,000 tons in 1960 to 25,000 tons in 1970. Id.
372 Coal consumption in the residential-commercial sector fell from 115 million tons in 1950
to 16 million tons in 1970. See DOE, 2010 ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW, supra note 363. The use of
natural gas by the residential sector, meanwhile, rose from 1,198 billion cubic feet in 1950 to
4,837 billion cubic feet in 1970, and from 388 billion cubic feet to 2,399 billion cubic feet in the
commercial sector. Id. at 201 tbl.6.5. During the same period, the use of fuel oil by the
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coal-fired to diesel-electric locomotives by the railroads.' In fact, the drop
in emissions from the railroad industry and the residential/commercial
sector accounts for fully 72% of the overall decline during this twenty-year
period, while emissions from wildfires account for an additional 26% of the
decline.'7 Meanwhile, particulate matter emissions from electric utilities
increased nearly 21% between 1950 and 1970,3" a rise which is consistent
with the rapidly growing use of coal to generate electricity in the United
States.'6
Yet the emissions data do indicate that the electric utility industry was
taking some steps to reduce particulate emissions. Particulate emissions
from coal-fired electric generating stations fell about 16% between 1960 and
197031'-at a time when coal consumption by these facilities was increasing
by nearly 82%.37 This trend actually appears to have started at an earlier
time. For example, between 1950 and 1960, coal consumption by the electric
utilities almost doubled," but particulate emissions from these coal-fired
plants rose by only about 45%.' Nevertheless, the degree of control utilized
residential sector increased from 390,000 barrels per day to 883,000 barrels per day, and from
308,000 barrels per day to 587,000 barrels per day in the commercial sector. Id. at 160 tbl.5.13a.
373 Coal usage in the transportation sector dropped from 63 million tons in 1950 to 300,000 in
1970. DOE, 2010 ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW, supra note 363. At the same time, the use of distillate
fuel oil by the transportation sector (utilized, for instance, by diesel railroad engines) rose from
226,000 barrels a day to 738,000 barrels a day. Id at 162 tbl.5.13c. See also ANDREWS, supra note
105, at 207 (stating that real progress was made on urban air pollution only as cheap natural gas
was substituted for coal heating and as diesel locomotives replaced coal-fired engines).
374 The decline in emissions from these two categories (railroads and the residential-
commercial sector) totaled 2,936,000 tons per year between 1950 and 1970, compared to an
overall decline of 4,091,000 tons per year. EPA, AIR POLLuTANT EMISSION TRENDS, supra note 357,
at 3-13 tbl.3-5. PM,0 emissions from wildfires, which are highly erratic from year to year
influenced as they are by rainfall, are recorded to have dropped 1,095,000 tons, comparing
1950's experience with 1970. Id. at 3-8, 3-13 tbl.3-5. Decreases in a number of other sectors such
as chemicals, petroleum, and other industrial processes (e.g., agriculture, paper, and mineral
products) were largely offset by increases in areas such as electric generation, industrial
combustion, metals processing, waste disposal, and on-and off-road diesels. Id. at 3-13 tbl.3-5.
375 See EPA, AIR POLLUTANT EMISSION TRENDS, supra note 357, at 3-13 tbl.3-5 (reporting a rise
from 1,467,000 tons in 1950 to 1,775,000 tons in 1970).
376 See generally DOE, 2010 ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW, supra note 363, at 217 tbl.7.3, 239
tbl.8.2b. Overall annual coal consumption in the United States rose a scant 6% between 1950 and
1970, from 494.1 million tons to 523.2 million tons. Id. at 217 tbl.7.3.
377 See EPA, AIR POLLUTANT EMISSION TRENDS, supra note 357, at 3-13 tbl.3-5 (reporting a
decline from 2,092,000 tons in 1960 to 1,680,000 tons in 1970). The overall decline in PM,
emissions from all sources between 1960 and 1970 was about 16%, from 15,558,000 tons to
13,042,000 tons. Id. A fall in emissions from the residential-commercial and rail sectors, as well
as from forest fires, accounts for approximately half of that reduction. Id. (indicating reductions
of 658,000 tons, 85,000 tons, and 405,000 tons respectively). A number of other sectors
experienced declines during this period including chemicals, petroleum, other industrial
processes, and on-road diesels, while increases were seen in industrial combustion, metals
processing, waste disposal, and non-road diesels. Id
378 See DOE, 2010 ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW, supra note 363 (reporting an increase from 176.7
million tons in 1960 to 320.2 million tons in 1970).
379 See id. (reporting a rise from 91.9 million tons in 1950 to 176.7 million tons in 1960).
380 See EPA, AIR POLLUTANT EMISSION TRENDS, supra note 357, at 3-13 tbl.3-5 (reporting an
increase from 1,439,000 tons in 1950 to 2,092,000 tons in 1960).
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by the industry prior to 1970 pales in comparison with later years. Between
1970 and 1980, coal consumption by the electric utility industry rose again,
this time by 77.7%m (roughly equal to the increase in the 1960s), while
particulate emissions fell by 52.6%2 (over twice the rate of improvement
witnessed in the 1960s). This post-1970 trend intensified during the 1980s
with coal consumption rising 36%,m while particulate emissions dropped by
a dramatic 66.7%.3
To summarize, sulfur dioxide emissions, rather than declining, appear
to have risen sharply in the 1960s. While particulate emissions fell, most of
the reduction between 1950 and 1970 may be accounted for by fuel
switching among homeowners, various commercial enterprises, and the
railroads-along with a decline in wildfires in the benchmark years&s
However, it also appears that the electrical utility industry was making some
early strides forward in reducing particulate emissions, and some of that
progress appears to have pre-dated 19 60 .3m
Crandall, Portney, and Goklany, therefore, were incorrect in their
conclusions regarding sulfur dioxide. The ambient air monitoring data upon
which they relied so heavily appears to be unreliable and unrepresentative.'
Furthermore, instead of falling, the emissions data indicate dramatic growth
in sulfur dioxide emissions in the years before Congress enacted the Clean
Air Act in 19 7 0 ,38 a fact that appears to be confirmed by reference to coal
consumption data and the paucity of industrial efforts to control sulfur
dioxide emissions.8m The picture with regard to particulate matter is more
complex, however. While the ambient air quality monitoring data that these
commentators used cannot be regarded as reliable or representative,'90 the
emissions data do suggest that particulate pollution was improving during
the decades prior to 1970." Most of that improvement, however, was due to
fuel switching by homeowners, commercial enterprises, and the railroad
industry (changes which may well have produced some air quality
improvement in a number of our central city areas), as well as a drop in the
381 See DOE, 2010 ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW, supra note 363 (reporting a rise from 320.2
million tons in 1970 to 569.3 million tons in 1980).
382 See EPA, AIR POLLUTANT EMIsSION TRENDS, supra note 357, at 3-13 tbl.3-5 (reporting a drop
from 1,680,000 tons in 1970 to 796,000 tons in 1980).
38 See DOE, 2010 ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW, supra note 363 (reporting an increase from 569.3
million tons in 1980 to 774.2 million tons in 1990).
3 See EPA, AIR POLLUTANT EMISSION TRENDS, supra note 357, at 3-13 (reporting a fall from
796,000 tons in 1980 to 265,000 tons in 1990).
385 See supra notes 369-74 and accompanying text (describing the reduction in particulate
emissions between 1950 and 1970 in the non-energy sectors).
386 See infra note 428 and accompanying text (describing the early adoption of electrostatic
precipitators by the electrical industry); see also supra Part IV.A (noting that between 1950 and
1960, coal consumption nearly doubled while particulate matter increased less than 50%).
387 See supra Part L.B.
38 See supra Part IV.A.
389 See supra notes 361-68 and accompanying text.
390 See supra Parts HIA-B.
391 See supra Part IV.A. and text accompanying note 370.
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incidence of wildfires." Nevertheless, it is clear that the electrical utility
industry as well as other industrial sectors were working to reduce their
particulate emissions at least to some extent. How much of that effort can
be attributed to state and local regulation?
B. Sorting Out Cause and Effect
While municipal efforts to reduce smoke emissions date back to the
Progressive era,'93 significant reductions only came later, during the years
following World War II. Encouraged by the examples of St. Louis and
Pittsburgh, smoke control agencies in a number of American cities took
steps to rid their skies of thick clouds of smoke and soot.'O Often, however,
their task was facilitated by trends that had nothing to do with their efforts
to encourage or require compliance with their relatively simple regulatory
requirements.39
The post-war transition to cleaner, cheaper, and more convenient forms
of energy, such as using natural gas and fuel oil to heat homes and
commercial enterprises, as well as switching to diesel fuel to power new
locomotives, made the jobs of these smoke control agencies much easier."9
In addition, industry often acted to reduce their smoke emissions-at times
at the behest of municipal authorities.39' In many instances, however,
industry acted independently of the regulatory authorities."8 Smoke, since it
is composed of carbon and other combustible substances, was indicative of
incomplete combustion and therefore waste. It behooved industry,
therefore, to turn to new combustion techniques to conserve fuel. These
techniques included the use of mechanical stokers and pulverized coal, both
of which not only reduced coal consumption and produced less smoke, but
also lowered labor costs and increased boiler capacity.'9 The switch from
beehive coking ovens to byproduct ovens also reduced smoke emissions
while conserving coal and producing higher quality coke and other valuable
392 See STRADLING, supra note 96, at 172 (describing how all smoke-plagued cities, especially
Pittsburgh, benefited from the shift toward natural gas heating and diesel-powered locomotion);
supra Part IV.A and text accompanying notes 370-75.
393 See supra Part II.A.1 and text accompanying notes 100-19 (noting that efforts to reduce
smoke emissions started in the early 1880s and had a rocky history through the end of the
Second World War, due partly to the power and influence of industry, and the intervening forces
of World Wars I and II).
394 See UEKOETrER, supra note 101, at 85-86, 124-25 (describing the success of these two
cities in confronting the health problems posed by smoke emissions, influencing other cities to
take action, and prompting further public consideration of air pollution after World War 11).
395 See supra Part IIA1 and text accompanying notes 108-10, 127-43; supra Part II.A.2 and
text accompanying notes 157-64; infra Part IV.B and text accompanying notes 397-402, 422-52.
396 See supra Part I.A.1 and text accompanying notes 128-36 (discussing, for example, the
improvements garnered in Pittsburgh and St. Louis due to fuel switching from coal to natural
gas, along with advancements in industry, such as the movement from steam to diesel-electric
locomotives on railroads).
397 See supra Part H.A. 1.
398 See supra Part II.A. 1.
399 See supra Part H.A. 1. and text accompanying notes 108-10, 137-43.
670 [Vol. 42:627
OF FABLES AND FEDERALISM
products such as fertilizer, tar, and gas.'" Not only did these new processes
save money, but they also produced public relations benefits and helped
stave off nuisance suits as well as tough local regulation. Industry thus had
many reasons, apart from the efforts of local regulators, to reduce their
smoke emissions.
Following what appeared to be success in the fight against smoke,
these local air pollution control agencies found it difficult to make the
transition in the 1950s and 1960s from relatively simple smoke abatement to
the control of other dangerous but less obvious air pollutants such as sulfur
dioxide, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds, dozens of toxic
compounds, and small diameter particulate matter. 402 For the most part, they
were staffed with mechanical engineers who had been recruited to abate
smoke and little else.' The agencies, therefore, were ill-equipped in terms of
both professional orientation and technical expertise for the assumption of a
broader, more sophisticated pollution control agenda." Often, in fact, the
agencies just did not want to be responsible for dealing with pollutants that
were not readily perceptible to the senses. 405 In any case, many communities
had not created functioning air pollution control agencies, and the agencies
that were functioning were additionally handicapped by limited geographic
406
jurisdiction and limited resources.
In 1961, less than half of the communities in the United States that
suffered from major or moderate air pollution problems had established
functioning air pollution control programs, 407 and only eight county-wide
programs existed outside of California.40 s Moreover, just a handful of
states-six-had programs that enforced air pollution regulations.40 By
1966, even with the stimulus of federal grant money, the number of state
agencies actually engaged in any enforcement work had increased to only
nine, while over 80% of our largest counties had no programs at all.1 o
Although more cities had organized air pollution programs, the resources
necessary to support staff and technical facilities were sorely lacking. In
fact, the programs in our fifty largest cities received less than half of the
resources considered an acceptable minimum at the time.41' By the end of
the decade, the picture was not much improved. While by 1970 all fifty states
had air pollution programs, half of them were budgeted for less than ten
400 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
401 See supra Part H.A.1 and text accompanying notes 140-41.
402 See supra Part II.A.2 and text accompanying notes 148-151, 165-170.
403 UEKOETrER, supra note 101, at 13.
404 See supra Part II.A.2 and text accompanying notes 166-67.
405 SeeUEKOETTER, supra note 101, at 13.
406 See supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text; see also UEKOETTER, supra note 101,
at 13 (discussing the geographical limitations that hampered local efforts).
407 See supra Part II.A.2 and text accompanying notes 171-72.
408 See UEKOETTER, supra note 101, at 151.
409 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
410 See supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text.
411 See supra note 251 and accompanying text .
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employees and only six met minimum standards for adequacy.1 And while
the number of local agencies had grown to 188, less than half of them met
minimum standards for adequacy. So, despite the fact that the total
number of state and local programs had grown significantly during the
1960s,'14 largely due to federal support,"' most of the programs were weak
and ineffectual.
Other than in a few places, such as California and, to a more limited
extent, New York City,4 16 Most of these agencies had neither the ability nor
the apparent will to deal with air pollution other than smoke. Thus, it should
not be surprising that rather than decreasing, as Crandall, Portney, and
Goklany have claimed based upon fragmentary and unreliable ambient air
quality data, sulfur dioxide pollution was actually growing much worse."
Total national emissions of nitrogen oxides were also rapidly rising: they
were up 107% between 1950 and 1970.4 At the same time, emissions of
volatile organic compounds grew 48%419 and emissions of carbon monoxide
increased by 26%.420
While particulate emissions did fall during this period, it appears that
nonregulatory factors accounted for most of this progress.421' As we have
seen, a large portion of the smoky particulate problem was attacked by fuel-
switching and by the use of newer, more efficient industrial combustion
processes that not only conserved coal, but decreased labor costs, increased
boiler capacity, and, in some cases, produced valuable products. 2 In the
process, these industries also reduced the likelihood of nuisance actions and
unwanted regulatory action, and enhanced their standing in the local
community.4  Many of these same factors motivated industry to tackle other,
non-smoke related, particulate problems. A number of metal smelters, paper
mills, chemical plants, steel mills, and carbon black facilities installed
412 See supra notes 255-258 and accompanying text.
413 See supra text accompanying notes 254-56.
414 See GOKLANY, supra note 39, at 23, 151; supra Part II.C.
415 See supra notes 237-40, 249-55 and accompanying text.
416 See supra notes 180-211, 285 and accompanying text.
417 Emissions between 1960 and 1970 were up 40%. EPA, AIR POLLUTANT EMISSION TRENDS,
supra note 357, at 3-12 tbl.3-4. The rate of increase of sulfur dioxide emissions between 1950 and
1970 was also 40%. See id (reporting sulfur dioxide emissions of 22,357,000 tons in 1950 and
31,161,000 tons in 1970).
418 See id. at 3-10 tbl.3-2 (reporting nitrogen oxide emissions of 10,093,000 tons in 1950 and
20,928,000 tons in 1970). The rate of increase between 1960 and 1970 was 48%. See id. (reporting
nitrogen oxide emissions of 14,140,000 tons in 1960 and 20,928,000 tons in 1970).
419 See id. at 3-11 tbl.3-3 (reporting volatile organic compound emissions of 20,936,000 tons
in 1950 and 30,982,000 tons in 1970). The rate of increase between 1960 and 1970 was 27%. See
id. (reporting volatile organic compound emissions of 24,459,000 tons in 1960 and 30,982,000
tons in 1970).
420 See EPA, AIR POLLUTANT EMISSION TRENDS, supra note 357, at 3-9 tbl.3-1 (reporting carbon
monoxide emissions of 102,609,000 tons in 1950 and 129,444,000 tons in 1970). The rate of
increase between 1960 and 1970 was 18%. See id. (reporting carbon monoxide emissions of
109,745,000 tons in 1960 and 129,444,000 tons in 1970).
421 See supra Part IV.A and text accompanying note 369.
422 See supra Parts II.A. 1, IVA.
423 See supra Parts HA 1, IV.B.
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electrostatic precipitators and other filtration systems to recover substances
of value such as metals, chemical aerosols, and alkali.424 Once again, these
actions also served to promote good public relations, lessen the risk of
litigation, and forestall effective regulation.425 Of course, it is also likely that
some of these actions were at least partially prompted by the urging,
regulatory or not, of local air pollution control authorities.426
The industry that may well have done the most to reduce its overall
particulate emissions, the electric utility industry,4 27 did not recover valuable
product from the filtering process. However, the electric utilities had plenty
of reasons apart from regulation for its actions.
Throughout the period in question, the electrical utility industry strove
to produce ever greater amounts of electricity utilizing ever more efficient
processes." One way in which the industry increased the scale of electrical
production was through the use of larger, high-efficiency boilers. By grinding
coal into fine powder and then injecting the material into a boiler, the
industry was able to produce higher temperatures and greater steam
pressure.429 The process also burned coal more efficiently, permitted the use
of inferior grades of coal (those containing, for instance, more
noncombustible ash),4 0 and reduced smoke emissions.'' Unfortunately, the
process also had major drawbacks.
The higher temperatures fused the residual ash found in the coal into
abrasive particles"2 that, given the high velocity and heat in the boilers,
eroded the refractory brick lining the boilers.4 3 The ash, moreover, rather
than settling to the bottom of the boiler, was propelled by the turbulence
and heat inside the boiler up through the chimney and out into the
environment.' The damage to the refractory brick was largely solved by
424 See supra Part II.A.2.
425 See supra Part Hl.A.2 and text accompanying note 162.
426 By 1966, however, only 21 communities were regulating some form of solid particulate
matter emissions from sources other than coal combustion. Stem, supra note 108, at 47.
427 See supra Parts IV.A-B. In 1962, the electrical power industry operated more electrostatic
precipitators than any other industry in the United States. In fact, it operated more than a
quarter of all precipitators in operation in the country at the time. See WHITE, supra note 157, at
25 tbl.1.1 (showing that 880 of a total of 3,360 electrostatic precipitators in the United States
were being used in by the electric power industry).
428 See RICHARD F. HIRSH, TECHNOLOGY AND TRANSFORMATION IN THE AliIERICAN ELECTRIC
UTILITY INDUSTRY 15-21, 37-46, 56-70 (1989) (discussing the technological advancements
resulting from economic pressures that led to greater efficiency in the electricity industry
through the 1960s).
429 Id. at 45. The first use of pulverized coal to fire a utility boiler in the United-States came in
1919. See WHITE, supra note 157, at 21 (discussing the use of pulverized coal as a means to
increase power generation capacity).
430 ERICH RAASK, MINERAL IMPURITIES IN COAL COMBUSTION: BEHAVIOR, PROBLEMS, AND
REMEDIAL MEASURES 6 (1985); UEKOE'lER, supra note 101, at 95; Coffin, supra note 110, at 618,
622, 624 (discussing the successful use of pulverized coal containing up to 26% ash).
431 Stem, supra note 108, at 46; Coffin, supra note 110, at 624.
432 The abrasive nature of the ash results from the fusion of mineral impurities found in coal.
See RAASK, supra note 430, at 44.
433 HIRSH, supra note 428, at 45.
434 UEKOETTER, supra note 101, at 95.
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lining the boiler walls with water-carrying steel tubes, part of the steam
generation system.4 The problem with fly ash being expelled through the
chimney, however, remained.
The fly ash problem was substantial. Vast quantities were produced, as
10% or more of the coal that is burned in a utility's boiler may well be
emitted as fly ash,"a and the industry's appetite for coal was rapidly
growing-from nearly 92 million tons in 1950 to over 300 million tons in
1970. 13 Meanwhile, generating stations were growing ever larger and more
centralized concentrating and magnifying the production of fly ash. When
large high-efficiency power stations were built without any meaningful way
of extracting fly ash, the result was public outrage.439 People in surrounding
communities complained about Pompeii-like conditions, and school children
had to don hats at recess to get some protection from the falling ash."0
Therefore, the industry quickly learned, or otherwise understood, that
something had to be done to mitigate what would otherwise be a "fly-ash
plague" around their major new steam-fired plants." In 1923, four years after
the first high-efficiency power plant was built in the United States, the first
full-scale electrostatic precipitator was installed in an American power
plant."2 The industry, however, tended to favor the use of cheaper, less-
efficient mechanical fly ash collectors for their coal-fired plants located in
rural locations,"3 and often chose to install small precipitators in urban
locations rather than larger, more efficient units that could cost three times
more.4" By 1962, the industry had 880 electrostatic precipitators in place"'
and, most likely, an equal number or even more mechanical collectors."6 In
4s HIRSH, supra note 428, at 45.
436 WHITE, supra note 157, at 21.
437 DOE, 2010 ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW, supra note 363.
8 See JACK CASAZZA & FRANK DELEA, UNDERSTANDING ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS: AN
OVERVIEW OF TECHNOLOGY, THE MARKETPLACE, AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION 8 (2d ed. 2010)
(referring to load growth and subsequent cost reductions that characterized the "golden age" of
electric utilities, a period from 1945 to 1965); HIRSH, supra note 428, at 20-21, 36-46, 56-58, 60
(describing the shift towards larger, more interconnected power plants).
439 UEKOE'ITER, supra note 101, at 96 (referring to two large German power plants that went
into operation during the 1920s and the resulting backlash from the surrounding communities).
440 Id. at 95-96.
441 See Id. at 96 (recounting how two power plants in Sodingen and Berlin, Germany
recognized the need to curb fly-ash emissions or face "bureaucratic intervention").
442 WHITE, supra note 157, at 21.
443 Id. A multicyclone collector, for example, would collect approximately 70% of the fly ash
from the stack gases. WAYNE T. SPROULL, AIR POLLUTION AND ITS CONTROL 62 (2d ed. 1972).
These mechanical systems were significantly less expensive than electrostatic precipitators.
UEKOETTER, supra note 101, at 99.
44 SPROULL, supra note 443, at 62-63. A precipitator designed to collect 90% of the fly ash
had a size and cost that were considered tolerable by most utility companies. Id. Units designed
to recover 99% of the fly ash would, by contrast, cost twice as much, while a unit recovering
99.9% would cost three times more. Id. Many units, however, failed to achieve these levels of
efficiency due to lack of maintenance or changes in fuel or operating conditions. Gartrell, supra
note 365, at 502-03.
445 WHITE, supra note 157, at 25.
446 According to one survey of systems installed between 1958 and 1962, 62% were
mechanical collectors as opposed to electrostatic precipitators. See John. R. O'Connor &
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short, the use of some sort of fly ash collection system had become standard
practice in the industry since nuisance-like conditions could be averted with
relatively "little effort and expense."" It would be difficult to credit local
control authorities for much of this development since only five local
agencies had regulations in place in 1956 governing solid particulate
emissions from coal combustion."4 Even by 1966, only one-third of the
communities that suffered from moderate to severe air pollution problems
had regulations on the books-implemented or not-dealing with fly ash
emissions.
While a number of local and, perhaps, state programs can take some
credit for reducing particulate emissions (primarily smoke) during the post-
war period, one must be careful not to exaggerate the amount of credit that
is due. It appears, in fact, that most of the cleanup should be attributed to a
variety of nonregulatory factors ranging from fuel switching to the recovery
of valuable products, from labor saving devices to larger, more efficient
combustion processes, and to industry's desire to burnish its image while
avoiding nuisance actions and tough regulation." With regard to other air
pollutants, including sulfur dioxide, most of these programs are due little or
no credit. These problems were simply growing worse amid little
regulation.451 Despite large-scale federal assistance during the 1960s and the
existence of some exemplary programs, the necessary regulatory
infrastructure was often nonexistent or nearly so at the state and local level.
The three studies that Revesz and Adler relied upon were, therefore,
incorrect in their conclusions. There was no broad improvement in sulfur
dioxide pollution before 1970, and most of the improvement that occurred
with regard to particulate emissions had little to do with state or local
regulation. Revesz and Adler were thus mistaken in asserting, based on these
three studies, that state and local regulatory efforts were responsible for
significant improvements prior to the advent of federal regulation.4 52 The
Joseph F. Citarella, An Air Pollution Control Cost Study of the Steam-Electric Power Generating
Industry, 20 J. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL Ass'N 283, 285 (1970) (describing trends in the
installation of mechanical collectors). For the period of 1963-1967, the numbers were reversed
with electrostatic precipitators accounting for 78% of the total. Id
47 UEKOETTER, supra note 101, at 122.
44 Stern, supra note 108, at 47.
449 See id. (referring to regulations in 65 communities: 53 cities and 12 counties); Ripley,
supra note 145, at 226 (indicating that approximately 198 communities had moderate or severe
air pollution problems in the early 1960s).
450 See supra Part H.A. 1.
451 As Arthur Stem declared in 1966, "The problem of air pollution continues to grow faster
than the combined Federal, State, and local efforts to deal with it." UEKOETTER, supra note 101,
at 219. Dr. Stem was a pioneer in the air pollution control movement. With support from the
Works Progress Administration, he studied smoke pollution in New York City during the 1930s.
Later, he worked on air pollution control issues for the New York state government and joined
the U.S. Public Health Service's air pollution program in the early 1950s. In 1968, he accepted an
appointment as Professor of Air Hygiene at the University of North Carolina. MERRIL EISENBUD,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 6 MEMORIAL TRIBUTES
221 (1993).
452 Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation, supra note 35, at 579; Adler, Judicial
Federalism, supra note 35, at 465.
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historical record, in fact, indicates that state and local regulation prior to
1970 was not equal to the task at hand. A new approach was desperately
needed.
V. AIR QUALITY AND EMISSIONS TRENDS SINCE
THE PASSAGE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT IN 1970
Compared to the nominal gains that regulation produced prior to 1970,
the progress made since the Clean Air Act was enacted in 1970 has been
absolutely phenomenal. Particulate matter (PM,,) emissions, for example,
fell from 12,184,000 tons in 1970 to 2,053,000 tons in 2011, a drop of 83%.453
During the same period, sulfur dioxide emissions declined from 31,218,000
tons to 7,999,000 tons, a 74% reduction. What makes these decreases even
more remarkable is the fact that coal combustion in the United States
doubled between 1970 and 2010, from 523,200,000 tons to over 1 billion
tons.M Ambient air quality data reflect these improvements. Sulfur dioxide
concentrations, for instance, improved 54% between 1983 and 2002, a period
453 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL EMISSIONS INVENTORY AIR POLLUTANT EMiSSIONS
TRENDS DATA, PMl0Primary tab (2011) [hereinafter EPA, NATIONAL AIR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS
INVENTORY], available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/trends/index.html (click on "1970-2012
Average annual emissions, all criteria pollutant in MS Excel") Emissions for the miscellaneous
category, which only included forest fires in 1970, were excluded since EPA added other
sources such as dust from unpaved roads and agriculture in 1985. Id.; EPA, AIR POLLUTANT
EMISSION TRENDS, supra note 357, at 3-13 tbl.3-5.
454 See EPA, NATIONAL AIR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS INVENTORY, supra note 453, at S02 tab
(excluding emissions from forest fires).
455 DOE, 2010 ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW, supra note 363. However, data from the residential
and commercial, industrial, transportation, and electric power sectors, shows that consumption
of fuel oil fell 8% during that period, from a combined 4,744,000 barrels per day to 4,334,000
barrels per day. See id. at 160 tbl.5.13a (reporting a drop in residential distillate, commercial
distillate, and commercial residual fuel oil consumption from a combined 1,470,000 barrels per
day in 1970 to 535,000 barrels per day in 2010); id. at 161 tbl.5.13b (reporting a decline in the
industrial sector from 1,285,000 barrels per day of distillate and residual fuel oil in 1970 to
586,000 in 2010); id. at 162 tbl.5.13c (reporting an increase in the transportation sector from
1,070,000 barrels per day of distillate and residual fuel oil in 1970 to 3,108,000 in 2010), 163
tbl.5.13d (reporting a drop in the electric power sector from 919,000 barrels per day of distillate
and residual fuel oil in 1970 to 105,000 in 2010).
456 The number of air quality monitors grew tremendously after 1970. By 1980, for example,
there were 522 carbon monoxide monitors, 1,113 sulfur dioxide monitors, 224 nitrogen oxide
monitors, 3,595 monitors for total suspended particulate matter, and 791 ozone monitors. U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1970 TO 1990, at C-2 tbl.
C-1, C-5 tbl.C-3, C-7 tbl.C-5, C-14 tbl.C-6, C-21 tbl.C-13 (1997) [hereinafter EPA, BENEFITS AND
COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1970-1990). Currently, there are approximately 4,000 air
monitoring stations in the State and Local Air Monitoring Network (SLAMS), a subset of
approximately 1,080 of which are part of the National Air Monitoring Network (NAMS). These
two networks date from 1979. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 58.2(c), 58.20(a), 58.30(a) (1979); NAT'L RES.
CouNcIL, AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 221 (2004). Also in 1979, EPA
significantly improved the methodology governing the monitoring process. See 44 Fed. Reg.
27,571 (May 10, 1979) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 58.10-58.14, 58.22, 58.33, pt. 58 app. c).
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during which emissions fell 33%, while PM concentrations improved 13%
between 1993 and 2002, a period during which emissions declined 22%.4
The record with regard to other air pollutants has been impressive as
well. Emissions of carbon monoxide, a pollutant that is primarily generated
by motor vehicles fell 74% between 1970 and 2011, from 197,277,000 tons
per year to 51,986,000 tons per year.4 9 And the ambient air quality data
appears to validate the general magnitude of that reduction, showing 65%
improvement between 1983 and 2002.4w Emissions of the two precursors of
ground-level ozone pollution-nitrogen oxides and volatile organic
compounds 0 -also evince progress. Emissions of nitrogen oxides dropped
55% between 1970 and 2011,462 while air quality concentrations improved 21%
between 1983 and 2002." Meanwhile emissions of volatile organic
compounds fell 65% between 1970 and 2011,'6 which appears to be
confirmed by a 65% improvement in air quality concentrations between 1983
and 2 002 ." Ground-level ozone, however, remains a problem. Although air
quality concentrations fell 18% between 1983 and 1993, they rose by 4%
between 1993 and 2002." Since 2001, the trend has once again been
downward, declining 10% between 2001 and 2008,46 with the majority of the
improvement occurring in the eastern portion of the country4 -a region
which had just undergone a significant tightening of limitations governing
nitrogen oxides.
Even emissions of pollutants which have only been regulated for a short
period of time have shown remarkable improvement. Emissions of
457 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, LATEST FINDINGS ON NATIONAL AIR QUALITY: 2002 STATUS AND
TRENDS 3 (2003) thereinafter EPA, NATIONAL AIR QUALITY 2002 REPORT]. The later starting date
for the PM,, data reflects the fact that a shift from total suspended particulate matter monitors
to PMo monitors began in the mid-1980s. EPA, BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1970-
1990, supra note 456, at C-13.
458 Oren, supra note 5, at 1235.
459 See EPA, NATIONAL AIR POLLUTANT EMIssIONS INVENTORY, supra note 453, at CO National
tab (excluding emissions from forest fires).
460 EPA, NATIONAL AIR QUALITY 2002 REPORT, supra note 457.
461 See AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 456, at 26 (noting that
ground-level ozone is formed by the reaction of either volatile organic compounds or nitrogen
oxides, or both, in the presence of sunlight).
462 See EPA, NATIONAL AIR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS INVENTORY, supra note 453, at NOX National
tab (reporting a reduction from 26,883,000 tons in 1970 to 12,009,000 tons in 2011).
463 EPA, NATIONAL AIR QUALITY 2002 REPORT, supra note 457.
464 See EPA, NATIONAL AIR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS INVENTORY, supra note 453, at VOC tab
(reporting a reduction from 34,659,000 tons in 1970 to 12,129,000 tons in 2011).
465 EPA, NATIONAL AIR QUAuTY 2002 REPORT, supra note 457.
466 See id. (reporting on eight-hour ozone concentrations).
467 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OUR NATION'S AIR: STATUS AND TRENDS THROUGH 2008 15 (2010)
[hereinafter EPA, NATIONAL AIR QUALITY 2008 REPORT] (reporting on eight-hour ozone
concentrations).
468 Id. at 17.
469 In 1998, EPA promulgated a rule (commonly referred to as the NOx SIP Call Rule) that
required 22 states in the eastern United States to revise their State Implementation Plans in
order to reduce nitrogen oxide emissions from electric power plants and other large stationary
sources by an overall 28% of 1996 levels by 2007. See 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,365, 57,378, 57,407,
57,433-34, 57,438-39 (Oct. 27, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 51, 72, 96).
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hazardous air pollutants, most of which were only regulated under a
program enacted in 1990, fell by about 40% between 1990 and 2005.70
Emissions of lead, perhaps the most ubiquitous of these hazardous
pollutants, have declined in an especially dramatic fashion. Between 1983
and 2002 emissions of lead, a toxic heavy metal that has been regulated for a
longer period than most other hazardous air pollutants, fell 93%, while air
quality concentrations improved by 94%."n
The analysis of air pollution trends is not a perfect science. Although
EPA has refined its methodology for determining air emissions4 and makes
use of some directly measured emissions, the dependence on estimates for
most of the calculation still injects a degree of uncertainty into EPA's
analyses. In addition, despite the fact that an extensive air quality
monitoring network has existed since the 1980s, that network was primarily
designed to monitor urban pollution levels and thus does not provide
broadly representative data.47 5 Furthermore, meteorological conditions can
produce a good deal of variability in concentrations, a fact that can be
mitigated but not entirely eliminated by the use of various statistical
methods like regression-based modeling.476 Nevertheless, air quality data can
be used to verify emissions trends,4" and that data would certainly appear to
confirm, qualitatively if not quantitatively, that air pollution emissions have
declined substantially since the Clean Air Act was enacted in 1970.4" And
while a number of nonregulatory factors may have been responsible for
reducing some emissions,7  it is absolutely clear that the Clean Air Act was
responsible for the lion's share of the progress that has been made over the
past forty years.
470 EPA, NATIONAL AIR QUAUTY 2008 REPORT, supra note 467, at 1-2.
471 EPA, NATIONAL AIR QUAITY 2002 REPORT, supra note 457, at 17.
472 See supra Part IVA.
473 See EPA, AIR POLLUTANT EMISSION TRENDS, supra note 357, at 1-3 (referring to the use of
continuous emission monitoring (CEM) data reported by sources, such as electric utilities, that
are regulated under the acid rain provisions of the Clean Air Act).
474 AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 456, at 218. But see id. at 217
(stating that CEM has produced "direct evidence of substantial reductions in SO 2 emissions
from utilities since the implementation of the acid rain controls").
475 Id. at 219.
476 Id at 237.
477 See id. at 219.
478 See id. ("[lit would appear that air quality monitoring data provide qualitative but not
quantitative confirmation that pollutant emission trends are downward (especially in urban
areas) in the United States.").
479 The decline of the American steel industry over the past 50 years is one example that
comes readily to mind. See PAUL A. TIFFANY, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN STEEL: How
MANAGEMENT, LABOR, AND GOVERNMENT WENT WRONG 3 (1988). The reduction in air pollution
from the steel industry's decline, however, was likely more than offset by other trends. For
example, the gross national product and the total number of miles driven more than doubled
during this period, and energy consumption increased by a factor of 1.5. See AIR QUALITY
MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 456, at 37.
480 See, eg, EPA, BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1970-1990, supra note 456, at
15-16 fig.2, fig.3, fig.5, fig.6 (concluding that, in the absence of the Clean Air Act, emissions of
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VI. CONCLUSION
Air pollution was not broadly declining before the Clean Air Act of 1970
was enacted. In fact, just the opposite was true. Sulfur dioxide emissions
were rapidly rising, as were a number of other emissions including carbon
monoxide"" and the two precursors of ozone pollution: nitrogen oxides 2
and volatile organic compounds.4 Only one pollutant parameter, particulate
matter, was falling to some extent, but most of that decline can be attributed
to fuel switching and a number of other factors other than state and local
regulation.4 Nevertheless, the nation does owe a debt of gratitude to the
pioneers of air pollution control who worked to abate smoky conditions in
many American cities, and to ,those scientists, engineers, and officials in
California and elsewhere who at a later time turned their attention to more
complex problems such as ozone pollution. While their contributions were
significant, the overall effort at the state and local level proved too
fragmented and much too meager. Rather than proving that the race-to-the-
bottom is intrinsically flawed, the record of air pollution regulation in the
United States prior to 1970 demonstrates that a greater level of federal
involvement was absolutely necessary. Fortunately, Congress acted in 1970
to chart a wholly new approach, an approach which, despite some
difficulties, has proven remarkably successful.
carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and particulate matter in 1990 would have
been larger by factors of approximately 2, 1.6, 1.4, and 3 respectively).
481 Carbon monoxide emissions rose from 102,609,000 tons in 1950 to 129,444,000 tons in
1970. EPA, AIR POLLuTANT EMISSION TRENDS, supra note 357, at 3-9 tbl.3-1.
482 Emissions of nitrogen oxide increased from 10,093,000 tons in 1950 to 20,928,000 tons in
1970. Id. at 3-10 tbl.3-2.
48 Emissions of volatile organic compounds jumped from 20,936,000 tons in 1950 to
30,982,000 tons in 1970. Id. at 3-11 tbl.3-3.
4 See supra Part IV.A.
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